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Leave Them Kids Alone: State
Constitutional Protections for
Gender-Affirming Healthcare
Jessica Matsuda*
Abstract
State legislatures across the nation are continually targeting
the rights of transgender individuals with a variety of laws
affecting everything from bathrooms to medical care. One
particularly invasive type of legislation, the gender-affirming
healthcare ban, seeks to prohibit all forms of healthcare that
align a person’s physical traits with their gender identity for
individuals under eighteen. Bans like this severely impede the
treatment necessary for transgender youth suffering from gender
dysphoria, which carries serious physical consequences and
sometimes fatal psychological repercussions. As legislative
sessions pass, more and more states are introducing and actually
enacting these bans.
Striking down these bans as constitutionally impermissible
is vital to ensuring that transgender individuals have equal
access to healthcare. As litigators bring important and crucial
lawsuits to challenge these bans under the federal Constitution,
this Note proposes and explores options under the lesser-known
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Law. A huge thank you to my advisor, Professor Allison Weiss, for her
guidance, and Professor Joan Shaughnessy for constantly pointing me in the
right direction. As always, my deepest gratitude to my mentor Professor
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having an open office door. Thank you to my sister Jay Venables for her
unending support, my friend Adrian Matthews for her unending criticism, and
my writing buddy Audrey Curelop for keeping me sane. Finally, thank you to
the amazing editorial team whose hard work got this Note to publication, Sam
Romano, Lara Morris, and Andrew Nissensohn.
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but highly valuable state constitution. Although often ignored,
many state constitutions contain enforceable rights that could
protect the existence of gender-affirming healthcare, especially if
federal constitutional protection is denied at the Supreme Court.
This Note specifically dives into the state constitutional right to
health as an avenue for greater protection, and argues that the
general principles of judicial federalism should protect the rights
of transgender individuals in this context. As the federal
landscape changes, this Note urges litigators to use all the
resources available to prevent unwarranted state interference,
including previously unenforced state constitutional provisions.
State legislators cannot be allowed to violate their own
constitutions in the campaign against transgender individuals,
and litigators have the ability and obligation to hold them
accountable.
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INTRODUCTION
Transgender people have always existed. They traveled to
the Virginia territory during the early days of European
settlement.1 They fought for the Union during the Civil War.2
They led the Stonewall riots.3 Today, openly transgender
leaders serve as government officials at the state and federal
level, playing important roles in the growth and prosperity of
the nation.4 Transgender people will continue to exist at every
stage of life—no law will ever be able to change this.
Regardless, many states are attempting to legislate
transgender individuals out of existence by banning medical
care that ensures full and happy lives for transgender youth.5
Cloaked in language seemingly in defense of children, these
1. See Life Story: Thomas(ine) Hall, WOMEN & THE AM. STORY,
https://perma.cc/UU36-4PMH (detailing the life of Thomasine Hall, a
gender-nonconforming person who came to the colony of Virginia in the 1600s
to work on a tobacco plantation).
2. See Kritika Agarwal, What Is Trans History?: From Activist and
Academic Roots, a Field Takes Shape, PERSPECTIVES ON HIST. (May 1, 2018),
https://perma.cc/5VG7-VVR6 (describing the story of Francis Clalin Clayton,
who “bent gender norms to fight in the US Civil War”).
3. See Marsha Johnson, Sylvia Rivera, and the History of Pride Month,
SMITHSONIAN (June 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/H3JT-35ML (describing the
leadership of Marsha P. Johnson and Sylvia Rivera in the Stonewall uprising).
4. See, e.g., Sophie Tatum, First Openly Transgender State Lawmaker
Elected in Virginia, CNN, https://perma.cc/T93S-K86S (last updated Nov. 8,
2017, 2:50 AM); Katelyn Burns, Rachel Levine’s Historic Confirmation to the
Biden Administration, Explained, VOX, https://perma.cc/UE9L-H32J (last
updated Mar. 24, 2021, 6:22 PM) (explaining that President Biden’s assistant
secretary at the Department of Health and Human Services, Rachel Levine, is
“now the highest-ranking openly transgender government official in US
history”).
5. See infra Part I.C.
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gender-affirming healthcare bans prohibit medical professionals
from treating minors suffering from gender dysphoria with
procedures that alter or block physical sex characteristics.6 The
alleged purpose of these bans is to protect children from the
“drastic” consequences of this type of healthcare, with many
states invoking their duty to promote the health and safety of
the public.7 This is, of course, illusory.
Gender-affirming healthcare bans are mechanisms to
demean and subjugate transgender individuals. They seek to
strip away a transgender individual’s autonomy while calling
into question certain aspects of the medical profession. They do
not promote health and do not protect anyone. Quite oppositely,
withholding gender-affirming healthcare from transgender
youth has serious physical and psychological consequences that
can be deadly.8 Without access to certain medications,
transgender minors experiencing puberty are forced to endure
permanent physical changes associated with a gender different
than that of their identity.9 And if that minor wishes to
transition as an adult, those physical changes can only be
reversed with expensive and invasive surgery.10 The negative
psychological consequences caused by this trauma put
transgender youth at a high risk of violence, substance abuse,
and suicide.11
This is unacceptable, and litigators have stepped in to
challenge the bans that have managed to become enforceable
law.12 In Arkansas, the first state to successfully enact a
gender-affirming healthcare ban, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) quickly filed suit to challenge its
constitutionality under the federal Constitution.13 While this is
a necessary and hopefully successful step, litigators need to
consider more pathways to protect transgender youth, especially
as the U.S. Supreme Court enters an era marked by a

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra Part I.C.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.A.
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conservative majority.14 This Note explores another viable
avenue for protection—the often forgotten but incredibly
promising state constitution. More specifically, this Note argues
that the right to health existing in some state constitutions
should strike down gender-affirming bans as impermissible
invasions of individual liberty.
This Note lays the groundwork for state constitutional
challenges to gender-affirming healthcare bans in five parts.
Part I will outline the current knowledge about gender
dysphoria and its recommended medical treatment, as well as
explain the basics of a gender-affirming healthcare ban.15 Part
II will describe the current litigation surrounding the Arkansas
ban and the obstacles that the litigation may face at the
Supreme Court.16 Part III then details the applicable principles
of judicial federalism, arguing that state courts could be optimal
venues to protect transgender youth from invasive state
interference.17 Part IV explores the possibility of striking down
bans with the state constitutional right to health.18 Finally, as a
case study, Part V challenges Montana’s proposed
gender-affirming healthcare ban by applying the right to health
contained in the state’s constitution.19
I.

GENDER-AFFIRMING HEALTHCARE AND ITS OPPOSITION

To understand the benefits and limits of gender-affirming
healthcare, a few key terms must be defined. First, the term
“transgender” encompasses all individuals whose gender does
not match their assigned biological sex at birth.20 It is an
umbrella term that includes persons transitioning from
male-to-female or female-to-male, as well as individuals who do
not identify with any gender.21 “Transition” is the process where

14. See infra Part II.B.
15. See infra Part I.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. Transgender, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENDER AND SOCIETY 843, 843 (Jodi
O’Brien ed., 2009).
21. See ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, DEFINITIONS RELATED SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY 4 (2021), https://perma.cc/TTP5-LQBY
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“a person begins living as the gender with which they identify”
rather than the sex they were assigned at birth.22 Depending on
the individual, transition “may include changing one’s first
name and dressing and grooming differently.”23 It may also
include medical aspects such as hormone therapy or surgery.24
A person’s transition “is not a one-step procedure,” but instead
“is a complex process that occurs over a period of time.”25
A “minor” is defined as a person who has not reached full
legal age, which in most states is eighteen years old.26 A “child”
is also anyone under eighteen years old,27 and an “adolescent”
describes anyone between puberty and adulthood.28 Adolescence
typically begins around ten years old.29 For the purposes of this
Note, the term “transgender youth” refers to an adolescent
whose gender does not match their birth sex. The next three
subparts will explain gender dysphoria and its medical
treatment,30 the consequences of withholding such treatment,31
and the general structure of a gender-affirming healthcare
ban.32

(PDF) (“Transgender [is] [a]n umbrella term for people whose gender identity
differs from the sex they were assigned at birth.”).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 4–5.
24. See id. at 5.
25. Id.
26. Minor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
27. Child, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://perma.cc/AY6J-C7MR.
28. Adolescent,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://perma.cc/8HTZ-Y8KW;
Adolescence, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://perma.cc/AGQ8-VQW8.
29. See Adolescence, supra note 28; Recognizing Adolescence, WHO,
https://perma.cc/2X22-YBDS (explaining that puberty begins around ten years
old in high income countries).
30. See infra Part I.A.
31. See infra Part I.B.
32. See infra Part I.C.
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The Treatment of Gender Dysphoria

Being transgender is not a mental health disorder.33
Transgender youth are susceptible to gender dysphoria.34
Gender dysphoria is a mental health condition in which an
individual experiences emotional distress caused by a
discrepancy between their gender identity and birth sex.35
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-5),36 gender dysphoria in adolescents consists
of two criteria: 1) a marked incongruence between one’s
experienced or expressed gender and their assigned gender; and
2) associated clinically significant distress or impairment areas
of functioning.37 The DSM-5 indicates that adolescents with
gender dysphoria will experience at least two of the following:
1) a marked incongruence between one’s expressed gender and
primary and/or secondary sex characteristics or anticipated
secondary sex characteristics; 2) a strong desire to be rid of one’s
primary and/or secondary sex characteristics because of a
marked incongruence with one’s experienced/expressed gender
(or in young adolescents, a desire to prevent the development of
the anticipated secondary sex characteristics); 3) a strong desire
for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of another
gender; 4) a strong desire to be of the other gender (or an
alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender);

33. Caroline Miller, Transgender Kids and Gender Dysphoria, CHILD
MIND INST., https://perma.cc/9HZ2-DZLR.
34. See id. (stating that the disconnect between a child’s experienced
gender and their birth sex can result in an acute distress called gender
dysphoria).
35. See WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE
FOR
THE
HEALTH
OF
TRANSSEXUAL,
TRANSGENDER,
AND
GENDER-NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 5 (7th ed. 2012) [hereinafter WPATH SOC]
(defining gender dysphoria). “Gender dysphoria” was previously known as
“Gender Identity Disorder,” but was reclassified in the most recent edition of
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5). Gender
Dysphoria Diagnosis, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://perma.cc/F3GS-DVVF.
Because both terms are treated as generally interchangeable in scholarly
work, this Note will use the most updated term.
36. The DSM-5 is the standard tool used by mental health professionals
in the United States to diagnose mental health disorders. See generally AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (5th ed. 2013).
37. Id. at 452–53.
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5) strong desire to be treated as the other gender (or an
alternative gender different from one’s assigned gender); 6) a
strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions
of the other gender (or an alternative gender different from one’s
assigned gender).38
Adolescents with gender dysphoria often suffer severe
distress caused by the conflict between their expressed gender
and their birth sex.39 This distress is significantly worsened by
puberty, the period where an adolescent’s body experiences the
physical maturation of secondary sex characteristics associated
with their birth sex.40 Many adolescents with gender dysphoria
describe this experience as “unbearable.”41 Some adolescents
endure this pain at such a high level that “the distress meets
the criteria for a formal diagnosis as a mental disorder.”42 It
should be noted here, though, that this diagnosis is not a “license
for stigmatization.”43 A disorder is something a person might
struggle with, not their identity.44 A transgender person is not
inherently disordered by virtue of being transgender; rather, the
distress of gender dysphoria can rise to the level of a diagnosable
condition for which many treatments are available.45

38. Id. at 452.
39. Emily Ikuta, Overcoming the Parental Veto: How Transgender
Adolescents Can Access Puberty-Suppressing Hormone Treatment in the
Absence of Parental Consent Under the Mature Minor Doctrine, 25 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 179, 211 (2016). Children are assigned their gender the
moment they are born, specifically when that assignment is marked on their
birth certificate. See Emily Maxim Lamm, Bye, Bye, Binary: Updating Birth
Certificates to Transcend the Binary of Sex, 28 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 1, 2–3
(2019). This process automatically places children “into a binding, binary sex
category that may or may not be true to them.” Id. at 22.
40. See Puberty, CLEVELAND CLINIC, https://perma.cc/8M8L-LH2B.
41. Hembree
et
al.,
Endocrine
Treatment
of
Gender-Disphoric/Gender-Incongruent Persons: An Endocrine Society Clinical
Practice Guideline, 102 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 3869, 3880
(2017).
42. WPATH SOC, supra note 35, at 5.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 6.
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Years of research have produced medical protocols to guide
the treatment of gender dysphoria for transgender individuals.46
The two major organizations to release such guidelines are the
Endocrine Society and the World Professional Association for
Transgender Health (WPATH). The Endocrine Society is an
international professional organization devoted to the clinical
practice of endocrinology, a branch of medicine that focuses on
the human hormonal system.47 Its guidelines specifically relate
to the treatment of gender dysphoria with medical hormones.48
WPATH is a multidisciplinary professional organization
devoted to promoting evidence-based care, education, research,
and advocacy in transgender health.49 Its main function is to
promote the best methods of treatment for transgender
individuals by producing its Standards of Care (“WPATH
SOC”).50 The WPATH SOC provides clinical guidance for health
professionals to assist transgender people based on the “best
available science” and “expert professional consensus.”51
Both of these guidelines explain how gender dysphoria can
and should be treated. The three primary categories of
treatment options are: 1) psychotherapy to explore gender
identity and expression; 2) physical interventions such as
hormone therapy or surgery to change sex characteristics; and
3) changes in gender expression and role, which may involve
living in another gender role consistent with one’s identity.52 It
is important to remember, though, that treatment of gender
dysphoria should be individualized—what helps one person may
be very different from what helps another.53 Although some
individuals need physical interventions or hormone treatment
to mitigate gender dysphoria, others may need neither to live

46. See Ikuta, supra note 39, at 189 (“Medical guidelines and protocols
have been developed to guide the treatment of transsexual, transgender, or
gender non-conforming people.”).
47. See Our History, ENDOCRINE SOC’Y, https://perma.cc/E6RX-VCYK; All
About
Endocrinology,
AM.
ASS’N
CLINICAL
ENDOCRINOLOGY,
https://perma.cc/Z39J-ZZU5.
48. See generally Hembree et al., supra note 41.
49. WPATH SOC, supra note 35, at 1.
50. Id.
51. Id. (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 9–10.
53. Id. at 5.
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comfortably.54 Some individuals need only psychotherapy to
reconcile their gender role with their birth sex and do not need
to physically change their body.55
For many, however, counseling and therapy will not be
enough to reduce the distress caused by gender dysphoria. In
these cases, the “heart of the problem” is the development of
unwanted and permanent sex characteristics that constantly
reinforce the conflict between one’s gender identity and birth
sex.56 For adolescents facing puberty, physical intervention to
suppress sex characteristics may be the only way to “buy time”
for them to think about their identity and meaningfully engage
in additional therapy.57 Before any physical interventions are
considered for minors, both the WPATH SOC and the Endocrine
Society recommend extensive mental health evaluation and an
official diagnosis of gender dysphoria.58 If physical interventions
are necessary for treatment, three categories of care become
relevant: fully reversible interventions, partially reversible
interventions, and irreversible interventions.59 Collectively, this
Note will refer to these interventions as “gender-affirming
healthcare.”
Fully reversible interventions are the most important for
transgender youth, primarily due to the urgency and
importance of delaying puberty. Puberty is the period of time
where individuals undergo sexual maturation, experiencing the
hormonal, physical, and physiological changes associated with

54. Id. at 8 (citations omitted).
55. Id.
56. Ikuta, supra note 39, at 191.
57. See Dateline: Hormone Treatment ‘Buys Time’ for Transgender Kids,
NBC NEWS (July 7, 2012), https://perma.cc/TVF4-AFV9 (detailing how Dr.
Norman Spack, “one of the first American doctors to treat transgender
children with hormone ‘blockers,’” asserts that certain health treatments can
delay secondary sex characteristics for transgender youth).
58. See WPATH SOC, supra note 35, at 18 (“Before any physical
interventions are considered for adolescents, extensive exploration of
psychological, family, and social issues should be undertaken . . . .”); Ikuta,
supra note 39, at 216 (“The . . . Endocrine Society guidelines stipulate that
puberty blockers be administered only after the child has been diagnosed with
gender dysphoria . . . and after psychiatric or mental health evaluations.”).
59. WPATH SOC, supra note 35, at 18.

LEAVE THEM KIDS ALONE

1607

the transition from childhood to adulthood.60 For males, this
process typically involves the development of secondary sex
characteristics like chest and facial hair, deepening of the voice,
and a considerable increase in height and mass.61 For females,
secondary sex characteristics may include menstrual periods,
breast development, and widened hips.62 Fully reversible
interventions freeze these characteristics before they begin—or
advance further—for the individual. This treatment consists of
medications, colloquially known as puberty blockers, that
suppress or inhibit puberty by blocking the production of
estrogen or testosterone.63
To receive puberty blockers, adolescents must meet the
following criteria set by the WPATH SOC: 1) the adolescent has
demonstrated a long-lasting, intense pattern of gender
nonconformity or dysphoria; 2) gender dysphoria has emerged
or worsened with the onset of puberty; 3) any coexisting
psychological, medical, or social problems that could interfere
with treatment have been addressed; and 4) the adolescent has
given informed consent.64 Adolescents who meet this criteria can
be treated with blockers at the beginning of puberty, when sex
characteristics first begin to appear.65 The Endocrine Society
guidelines recommend starting treatment at Stage Two of the
Tanner scale of physical development,66 a method of describing
development based on external primary and secondary sex

60. See Evan G. Graber, Physical Growth and Sexual Maturation of
Adolescents, MERCK MANUAL, https://perma.cc/6G3J-5VN2 (last updated Apr.
2021); supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See WPATH SOC, supra note 35, at 18.
64. Id. at 19. Additionally, the WPATH SOC recommends that if the
adolescent has not reached the age of medical consent, usually sixteen years
old, their parents or other caretakers should consent and be involved in
supporting the adolescent throughout the treatment. Id.
65. See S. Giordano, Lives in a Chiaroscuro. Should We Suspend the
Puberty of Children with Gender Identity Disorder?, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 580,
580 (2008).
66. See Hembree et al., supra note 41, at 3870 (“We recommend treating
gender-dysphoric/gender-incongruent adolescents who have entered puberty
at Tanner Stage G2/B2 . . . .”).
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characteristics.67 Stage Two usually begins around eleven years
old, when there is almost no breast development in girls or
genital enlargement in boys.68 Puberty blockers are most
effective in delaying permanent secondary sex characteristics
when employed at this point in an adolescent’s development.69
For adolescents suffering from gender dysphoria, puberty
blockers offer significant control over personal gender identity.70
By suppressing secondary sex characteristics before they are
truly wanted, puberty blockers give adolescents time to
experience their identity without “becoming trapped in a body
that feels alien and unnatural.”71 Delaying puberty is also a
crucial part of the diagnosis process itself, as it helps identify
children who want to transition.72 Research on the effectiveness
of puberty blockers shows promising results, as recent clinical
studies show that suppressing puberty is associated with
decreased “behavioral and emotional problems,” and significant
improvements to the general functioning of study participants.73
Adolescents who wish to proceed beyond puberty blockers
may be eligible for the second category of treatment available to
those suffering from gender dysphoria: partially reversible
intervention. Partially reversible interventions frequently
include cross-sex hormones that masculinize or feminize the
body.74 Transgender men who transition from female to male
take testosterone preparations, while transgender women

67. Mickey Emmanuel & Brooke F. Bokor, Tanner Stages, NAT’L LIBR. OF
MED., https://perma.cc/K3DA-SZU4 (last updated Dec. 15, 2021).
68. See id.
69. See Hembree et al., supra note 41, at 3881 (“Tanner Stage 2 is the
optimal time to start pubertal suppression.”).
70. See Ikuta, supra note 39, at 216 (“For adolescents diagnosed with
gender dysphoria, puberty blockers offer them the best solution to their
distress by allowing them to feel comfortable and in control of their identities
by the time they reach adulthood . . . .”).
71. Id. (citation omitted).
72. See Giordano, supra note 65, at 580.
73. Annelou L. C. de Vries & Peggy T. Cohen-Kettenis, Clinical
Management of Gender Dysphoria in Children and Adolescents: The Dutch
Approach, in TREATING TRANSGENDER CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY DISCUSSION 7, 20 (Jack Drescher & William Byne eds.,
2013).
74. WPATH SOC, supra note 35, at 20.
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transitioning from male to female take estrogen.75 Under the
Endocrine Society’s guidelines, adolescents can begin receiving
these cross-hormones at sixteen years old.76 If the adolescent
has received puberty blockers up to this point, cross-hormones
will belatedly start puberty in the desired gender instead of the
individual’s birth sex.77
After the age of eighteen, further considerations can be
made for the last category of physical treatment: irreversible
interventions.
Irreversible
interventions
are
surgical
procedures that change the face or genitalia.78 These include
facial reconstruction surgery to make features more masculine
or feminine, chest surgery to remove breast tissue or enhance
breast size, and surgery to reconstruct genitalia.79 The WPATH
SOC guidelines recommend that irreversible interventions,
particularly genital surgery, only be considered after an
individual has turned eighteen.80 If puberty blockers and
cross-hormones
have
been
administered
throughout
adolescence, surgical solutions pursued in adulthood are much
easier to achieve.81
States attempting to enact gender-affirming healthcare
bans threaten to interrupt this necessary care for transgender
youth suffering from gender dysphoria. As the next Subpart
explains, the consequences of these bans pose an immense
threat to the existence and quality of life of transgender youth.
B.

Physical and Psychological Effects of Delayed Treatment

Although some state lawmakers believe that the “most
advised” method for treating gender dysphoria is “watchful
75. See What Is Cross-Sex Hormone Therapy, INT’L SOC’Y FOR SEXUAL
MED., https://perma.cc/3LUS-GXWF.
76. See Hembree et al., supra note 41, at 3871. The WPATH SOC
guidelines provide similar direction. See WPATH SOC, supra note 35, at 20.
77. See Ikuta, supra note 39, at 215.
78. See WPATH SOC, supra note 35, at 21.
79. Gender Affirmation (Confirmation) or Sex Reassignment Surgery,
CLEVELAND CLINIC, https://perma.cc/CXH5-DKJQ.
80. See WPATH SOC, supra note 35, at 21 (“Genital surgery should not
be carried out until . . . patients reach the legal age of majority in a given
country . . . .”).
81. See Ikuta, supra note 39, at 215 (“Later, if surgery ensues, there is
much less of the wrong adulthood to undo.” (citation omitted)).
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waiting,”82 withholding treatment from transgender youth
experiencing gender dysphoria “is not a neutral option.”83 It has
serious physical and psychological consequences that not only
prolong the harmful distress of gender dysphoria, but contribute
to social abuse and stigmatization.84 In the majority of cases, the
possible risks associated with gender-affirming healthcare do
not outweigh these consequences.
The adverse effects of delayed treatment on the physical
body can be punishing for transgender youth. If allowed to
complete its course, puberty is permanent.85 The process
perpetually marks the adolescent as a member of their birth sex,
whether or not this matches their gender identity.86 Without
blockers, the physical changes endured during puberty can only
be erased by difficult, expensive, and invasive surgery.87 Even
with cross-hormones and surgery, these changes may not be
completely correctable.88 Postoperative transgender people who
surgically remove sex characteristics often deal with permanent
scars that make it difficult to pass as their legitimate gender.89
Some characteristics, like height and size, cannot be removed at
all.90

82. Ken Schneck, 14 of the Most Memorable Quotes from the HB 454
Hearing to Ban Trans Youth From Accessing Medical Care, THE BUCKEYE
FLAME (Feb. 17, 2022), https://perma.cc/9SVN-3DKB.
83. WPATH SOC, supra note 35, at 21 (“[W]ithholding puberty
suppression and subsequent feminizing or masculinizing hormone therapy is
not a neutral option for adolescents.”).
84. Id.
85. See Giordano, supra note 65, at 582 (“It is in fact clear that puberty
cannot be suppressed if it has completed its course.” (emphasis in original)).
86. See Stephanie Brill & Jennifer Hastings, Transgender Youth:
Providing Medical Treatment for a Misunderstood Population, NAT’L WOMEN’S
HEALTH NETWORK (July 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/KS35-JNQ9 (“For
transgender people, [puberty] means that they will permanently be a member
of the sex opposite to the one they experience themselves to be.”).
87. See David Alan Perkiss, Boy or Girl: Who Gets to Decide?
Gender-Nonconforming Children in Child Custody Cases, 25 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 63 (2014) (“Early commencement of sex reassignment by
administering puberty-blocking hormones may be appropriate because
puberty causes physical changes that are erased only with great difficulty, if
at all, at a later age.” (citation omitted)).
88. See Ikuta, supra note 39, at 213.
89. See id.
90. Giordano, supra note 65, at 580.
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Withholding treatment also triggers negative psychological
consequences for transgender youth. It is already common for
youth suffering from gender dysphoria to have coexisting
mental illnesses like anxiety and depression.91 When forced to
develop physical characteristics associated with their birth sex,
these feelings of distress and body aversion intensify.92 As many
medical practitioners report, young patients trying to live as a
gender different than their birth sex find this period
“intolerable.”93
The denial of necessary gender-affirming healthcare also
creates a “sense of hopelessness” for transgender youth
attempting to live comfortably in the world.94 The stress
associated with this hopelessness puts transgender youth at a
high risk of substance abuse, violence, and suicide.95 The suicide
rate among transgender youth is particularly high, with one
survey showing that 52% of transgender youth seriously
contemplated committing suicide in 2021.96
The risks associated with gender-affirming healthcare do
not outweigh the consequences of withholding it. There is
always the concern that gender-affirming healthcare will be
given to a minor who was incorrectly diagnosed with gender
dysphoria. Both the WPATH SOC and Endocrine Society
guidelines, however, recommend fully reversible puberty
blockers as the first step in treatment.97 And for partially
reversible and irreversible treatments, the Endocrine Society
and WPATH SOC recommend slow, staged processes that
gradually increase treatment overtime with regular clinical

91. WPATH SOC, supra note 35, at 12 (citation omitted).
92. See Giordano, supra note 65, at 581.
93. Susan Scutti, Transgender Youth: Are Puberty-Blocking Drugs an
Appropriate Medical Intervention?, MED. DAILY (July 24, 2013, 2:17 PM),
https://perma.cc/PS6U-63LR.
94. Ikuta, supra note 39, at 212 (citation omitted).
95. Giordano, supra note 65, at 581.
96. National Survey on LGBTQ Youth Mental Health 2021, THE TREVOR
PROJECT, https://perma.cc/F9V2-7JE7.
97. See WPATH SOC, supra note 35, at 18 (listing puberty blockers as
fully reversible treatment); Hembree et al., supra note 41, at 3880 (“Pubertal
suppression is fully reversible, enabling full pubertal development . . . after
cessation of treatment, if appropriate.”).
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evaluations.98 There is also a concern that only a small
percentage of children experiencing gender dysphoria will
physically transition in adulthood.99 Although that may be true
for children, the majority of adolescents who experience gender
dysphoria do eventually become transgender adults.100
It is not unethical to treat youth suffering from gender
dysphoria with gender-affirming healthcare—to the contrary, it
is unethical to let them suffer when treatments exist to alleviate
their pain.101 It is crucial that healthcare professionals retain
the freedom to assess their patients and provide competent care
that is in their best interest.
C.

Gender-Affirming Healthcare Bans

Regardless of the positive health benefits and treatment
safeguards associated with gender-affirming healthcare, many
states are attempting to wholesale ban it for minors. In 2021,
twenty state legislatures attempted to pass laws prohibiting
gender-affirming healthcare for individuals under eighteen.102
These laws are substantively the same across the states and
broadly prohibit medical professionals from performing

98. See Hembree et al., supra note 41, at 3871 (recommending a gradually
increasing dose schedule and regular clinical evaluation every three to six
months during the first year of treatment); WPATH SOC, supra note 35, at 18
(recommending a staged process “to keep options open through the first two
[types of interventions]”).
99. See infra Part II.A.
100. Giordano, supra note 65, at 581 (citation omitted).
101. See id. (“The appropriate response to a serious medical condition is
medical treatment. Early treatment prevents these children from growing in
an unwanted body, in a body that they would change anyway at a later stage,
at much higher costs.”).
102. See Legislation Affecting LGBT Rights Across the Country, ACLU
[hereinafter ACLU Tracker], https://perma.cc/L7FM-36T7 (last updated July
9, 2021) (cataloging state legislation prohibiting healthcare for transgender
youth). This number has steadily grown in recent years. See Past Legislation
Affecting
LGBT
Rights
Across
the
Country
2020,
ACLU,
https://perma.cc/ZT98-HKY5 (last updated Mar. 30, 2020) (noting that fifteen
states tried to pass healthcare bans in 2020); Past Legislation Affecting LGBT
Rights Across Country 2019, ACLU, https://perma.cc/ZD56-ZXXY (noting that
four states tried to pass healthcare bans in 2019). Recent data shows that in
the 2022 legislative season twenty-one states at least attempted to pass a
gender-affirming healthcare ban. Legislation Affecting LGBT Rights Across
the Country, ACLU, https://perma.cc/5TP2-T3PU (last updated Aug. 12, 2022).

LEAVE THEM KIDS ALONE

1613

procedures or prescribing medication intended to alter the
appearance of a minor’s gender.103 The medical professionals
typically encompassed under such legislation include licensed
physicians, physician’s assistants, nurses, psychologists, and
behavioral health or human services professionals.104
The types of care prohibited by these bans are nearly
identical to the medical procedures necessary to treat
adolescents suffering from gender dysphoria. West Virginia’s
ban, for example, lays out the two categories of treatment
generally prohibited by all gender-affirming healthcare bans.105
The first category prevents medical professionals from
prescribing puberty-blockers or cross-sex hormones.106 The
second category prohibits any surgery that removes “otherwise
healthy or non-diseased body parts or tissue,” specifically
banning phalloplasty, vaginoplasty, and mastectomy.107 All of
these procedures are prohibited “for the purpose of attempting
to change or affirm the minor’s perception” of their gender.108
West Virginia’s law, like most others, does have an exception for
minors who have “external biological sex characteristics that are
irresolvably ambiguous.”109 This exception applies to intersex
children, who may be born with sexual anatomy that does not
fit the traditional boxes of female or male.110 For this group,
gender-affirming healthcare is permitted, ostensibly to fit them
within one gender category.
States attempting to pass gender-affirming healthcare bans
employ at least one of three strategies to enforce them.111 The
103. See, e.g., S.B. 10, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2021) (prohibiting “the
performance of a medical procedure or the prescription . . . of medication, upon
or to a minor child, that is intended to alter the appearance of the minor child’s
gender or delay puberty, with certain exceptions.”).
104. See, e.g., S.B. 224, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2021).
105. H.B. 2171, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2021)
106. Id. at 1–2.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1.
109. Id. at 2.
110. What’s Intersex?, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://perma.cc/9UUCK539.
111. Additionally, many laws prohibit the use of public funds for this care.
See, e.g., H.B. 454, 134th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2021). Unfortunately,
the scope of this Note cannot cover the range of issues involved in public
healthcare funding.
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most serious strategy is the establishment of criminal penalties
for medical professionals who violate the ban. Arizona’s
legislation, for example, assigns felony status to any healthcare
professional who attempts to change, block, or affirm a minor’s
sex characteristics.112 If done intentionally or knowingly—a
state of mind a doctor should have when prescribing care—the
resulting Class 2 felony comes with the possibility of a
twelve-year imprisonment.113 Other states punish violators by
subjecting them to disciplinary action from the state’s medical
licensing agency. Oklahoma’s ban exposes medical professionals
to “suspension or revocation” of their license if they provide
gender-affirming healthcare to a minor.114 Some states
additionally enable civil claims against medical professionals
who violate these bans.115 Georgia’s law allows an “individual
aggrieved” by a violation to bring a claim to recover damages,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and punitive damages from
healthcare professionals who provide gender-affirming
treatment.116
The sudden appearance and identical nature of these laws
across the states raises the question of who, if anyone, is
responsible for starting this legislative movement. Although
some may assume that these bans are a natural backlash to
transgender issues becoming more prominent in mainstream
media, the origin of these laws reveals a more insidious
beginning. In 2019, the Heritage Foundation, one of the “most
influential conservative think tanks in the United States,”
“hosted a series of events on the ‘medical risks’ of
gender-affirming healthcare” at its Washington, D.C.

112. See S.B. 1511, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021) (assigning Class 2,
Class 3, or Class 4 felony status to violators); see also H.B. 935, 2021 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2021) (establishing “criminal penalties for health care practitioners
who perform or cause [gender-affirming healthcare] practices to be performed
on a minor”).
113. See S.B. 1511, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-702 (2022) (stating that the term of imprisonment for an aggravated
Class 2 felony ranges from three to twelve-and-a-half years).
114. S.B. 583, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2021).
115. See, e.g., H.B. 336, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2021).
116. See H.B. 401, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021). Georgia’s law also
explicitly excuses healthcare professionals who refuse to provide gender-based
healthcare from any civil or criminal liability. Id.
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headquarters.117 The cohost of one of these events, the Family
Policy Alliance, is a group that “works with legislators all over
the country” to produce model gender-affirming healthcare bans
for state legislatures.118 With the text of these bans varying only
slightly state to state, there is little “mystery” to how these bills
got into the hands of state legislators during the same time
period.119
Model legislation is not a new trend in the United States and
it is not limited to conservative groups.120 The connection of these
bans to a powerful group like the Heritage Foundation, however,
reveals the network of individuals at the heart of the
anti-transgender movement.121 This network, backed by an
imposing revenue of over $122 million,122 is launching one of the
most “aggressive and serious set of attacks” on transgender
people in years.123 While many gender-affirming healthcare bans
will hopefully never become law, the ones that do have extremely
serious consequences.
II.

THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS NIGHTMARE AT THE
FEDERAL LEVEL

If left unchallenged, gender-affirming healthcare bans will
eliminate the care necessary for transgender youth to alleviate
the harsh effects of gender dysphoria and fully realize their
individual identities. Fortunately, litigators have stepped in to

117. Outlawing Trans Youth: State Legislatures and the Battle Over
Gender-Affirming Healthcare for Minors, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2163, 2172–73
(2021).
118. Sydney Bauer, The New Anti-Trans Culture War Hiding in Plain
Sight, NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/G3MJ-49E5.
119. Although the bills may be substantively identical, many legislators
have come up with their own unique, terrible legislative titles, including: the
Protect Minors From Mutilation and Sterilization Act (Colorado), the Save
Adolescents From Experimentation Act (Arkansas), and the Vulnerable Child
Protection Act (South Dakota). See Past Legislation Affecting LGBT Rights
Across the Country 2020, supra note 102; ACLU Tracker, supra note 102.
120. See Bauer, supra note 118.
121. See id. (exposing the groups attempting to pass anti-transgender
state legislation).
122. Heritage Foundation, PROPUBLICA, https://perma.cc/26WJ-RMDQ.
123. Bauer, supra note 118.
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challenge the bans that have become enforceable law.124
Unfortunately, these suits may face resistance from higher
federal courts as the Supreme Court’s conservative
jurisprudence continues to grow. The following Subparts will
explain the legal challenges involved in the current
gender-affirming healthcare litigation in Arkansas and evaluate
the obstacles that litigation may face at the Supreme Court.
A.

The Federal Lawsuit in Arkansas

Although four states have now enacted gender-affirming
healthcare bans, this Note will focus on the current litigation
surrounding the first state to do so, Arkansas.125 On February
25, 2021, Representative Robin Lundstrum introduced the Save
Adolescents From Experimentation (SAFE) Act126 to the state
legislature of Arkansas.127 The SAFE Act prohibits licensed
physicians from providing any gender-affirming healthcare to
individuals under eighteen, including genital gender
reassignment surgery, non-genital gender reassignment
surgery, and hormone and puberty blocking drugs.128 Any
violation of the SAFE Act by a healthcare professional is
considered “unprofessional conduct” subject to discipline by “the
appropriate licensing entity”—the Arkansas State Medical
Board.129 The SAFE Act also creates a claim for relief for any
violation, allowing individuals under eighteen to bring legal
actions through their parent or guardian.130

124. See, e.g., Families Sue Alabama Over Felony Ban on
Gender-Affirming Care for Transgender Adolescents, ACLU (Apr. 11, 2022),
https://perma.cc/H7MZ-B4HY.
125. See Attacks on Gender-Affirming and Transgender Health Care, AM.
COLL. OF PHYSICIANS (May 3, 2022), https://perma.cc/8NPC-CADG (“In 2021,
Arkansas became the first state in the country to ban gender-affirming health
care for transgender minors. Since then, Tennessee, Arizona, and Alabama
have also enacted laws restricting access to gender-affirming care . . . .”).
126. H.B. 1570, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2021).
127. See HB1570—To Create the Arkansas Save Adolescents from
Experimentation (SAFE) Act, ARK. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://perma.cc/A6Y4CZEA.
128. H.B. 1570, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2021).
129. Id. at 9–10.
130. Id. at 10.
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The legislative purpose attached to this bill is a good
example of the typical formula—vilifying gender-affirming
healthcare as inexcusably dangerous while painting the state as
the protector of children. According to the SAFE Act, “Only a
small percentage of [individuals] experience distress identifying
with their biological sex,” and because many come to identify
with that sex, “physiological interventions [are] unnecessary.”131
The bill describes the state’s concern with puberty blocking
drugs, cross-sex hormones, and gender reassignment surgery
with full pages listing associated health risks.132 Leaning on the
“compelling government interest in protecting the health and
safety of . . . vulnerable children,” the SAFE Act summarizes:
It is of grave concern to the General Assembly that the
medical community is allowing individuals who experience
distress at identifying with their biological sex to be subjects
of irreversible and drastic nongenital gender reassignment
surgery and irreversible, permanently sterilizing genital
gender reassignment surgery, despite the lack of studies
showing that the benefits of such extreme interventions
outweigh the risks[.] The risks of gender transition
procedures far outweigh any benefit at this stage of clinical
study on these procedures.133

The SAFE Act passed both the Arkansas House of
Representatives and Senate in March 2021.134 It met opposition
from Governor Asa Hutchinson’s, who vetoed the bill as “a vast
government overreach.”135 In a stunning move, however, the
legislature was able to push the SAFE Act past Governor
Hutchinson with over three-fourths of each body voting to

131. Id. at 1–2.
132. Id. at 2–3.
133. Id. at 1, 5.
134. See HB1570—To Create the Arkansas Save Adolescents from
Experimentation (SAFE) Act, supra note 127.
135. Vanessa Romo, Arkansas Governor Vetoes Ban on Gender-Affirming
Healthcare for Trans Youth, NPR (Apr. 5, 2021, 5:46 PM),
https://perma.cc/2JS6-JC54 (reporting Governor Hutchinson’s statement that
the bill would set “new standards of legislative interference with physicians
and parents as they deal with some of the most complex and sensitive matters
involving young people”).
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override his veto.136 Apologizing for this outcome, Governor
Hutchinson stated that the SAFE Act “puts a very vulnerable
population in a more difficult position” and “sends the wrong
signal.”137
The ACLU immediately filed suit in federal court to block
the ban from coming into effect.138 The plaintiffs challenging the
law included four families with children in need of
gender-affirming healthcare and two doctors seeking to provide
that care.139 These parties alleged three constitutional violations
in their complaint: 1) violation of the Equal Protection Clause
under the Fourteenth Amendment through sex-based
discrimination; 2) violation of the right to parental autonomy
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
and 3) violation of the right to free speech under the First
Amendment.140 The District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas granted the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction to
prohibit the SAFE Act’s enforcement,141 and that injunction was
recently upheld by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.142 With
transgender youth in Arkansas currently safe from the SAFE
Act, the suit is now moving through discovery in preparation for
summary judgment or trial.143

136. See Meredith Deliso, Arkansas State Legislature Overrides Governor’s
Veto on Transgender Health Care Bill, ABC NEWS (Apr. 6, 2021, 3:58 PM),
https://perma.cc/3LB4-ZDEK.
137. Vanessa Romo, Arkansas Gov. Asa Hutchinson on Transgender
Health Care Bill: ‘Step Way Too Far’, NPR (Apr. 6, 2021, 7:36 PM),
https://perma.cc/H8TM-7QMC.
138. See James Esseks, We’re Suing Arkansas Over its Ban on Health Care
for Trans Youth, ACLU (May 25, 2021), https://perma.cc/9CFK-WWAJ.
139. See Brandt et al. v. Rutledge et al., ACLU, https://perma.cc/3JX352ZU (last updated Feb. 14, 2022) (describing the personal stories of the
plaintiffs involved in the federal lawsuit).
140. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 41–46, Brandt v.
Rutledge, 551 F. Supp. 3d 882 (E.D. Ark. 2021) (No. 4:21-cv-450-JM).
141. Supplemental Order at 13, Brandt v. Rutledge, 551 F. Supp. 3d 882
(E.D. Ark. 2021) (No. 4:21-cv-450-JM).
142. Brandt v. Rutledge, 47 F.4th 661, 672 (8th Cir. 2022); see also Federal
Court Upholds Preliminary Injunction Against Arkansas Ban on
Gender-Affirming Care for Trans Youth, ACLU (Aug. 25, 2022),
https://perma.cc/439B-AHD4.
143. See Brandt et al. v. Rutledge et al., Docket No. 4:21-cv-00450 (E.D.
Ark. May 25, 2021), Court Docket, BLOOMBERG L., https://perma.cc/XMY3TBAS.
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The ACLU’s suit is absolutely appropriate and necessary.
But a cloud looms in the background of this lawsuit—a Supreme
Court with six conservative justices. Should the preliminary
injunction or the final decision reach the current Court, the
outcome may not be as positive. In fact, there are signs that it
could be much worse.
B.

The New Majority on the Supreme Court

To some extent, the writing is on the wall at the U.S.
Supreme Court.144 This writing signals that federal courts
should not be the only, and may not be the optimal, place to
attack gender-affirming healthcare bans. The trajectory of the
Court’s most recent individual rights cases should cause most
litigators to stop and think about the true possibility of defeat
at our highest court—and seriously consider alternatives.145
The current Supreme Court is the culmination of decades of
conservative efforts to seize control of the highest judicial body
in the United States.146 Beginning in earnest with President
Richard Nixon’s promise to fill the bench with strict
constructionists,147 this movement ebbed and flowed until its
current conclusion—President Donald Trump’s appointment of
Justices Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney
Barrett to form a 6 to 3 conservative majority.148 For the first
144. See Nina Totenberg, The Supreme Court Is the Most Conservative in
90 Years, NPR (July 5, 2022, 7:04 AM), https://perma.cc/SYN6-5DJ5.
145. See infra notes 155–166 and accompanying text.
146. See Adam Serwer, The Lie About the Supreme Court That Everyone
Pretends to Believe, THE ATL. (Sept. 28, 2021), https://perma.cc/FA3Y-R29H
(“The current makeup of the Roberts Court is itself the outcome of a partisan
battle that has spanned decades, one in which the conservative legal
movement has won a tremendous victory that is certain to shape American life
for generations to come.”).
147. See Nixon and the Court, PBS, https://perma.cc/8X2A-FLAM (“In his
campaign for president, Richard Nixon promised to respond to the social
upheaval of the 1960’s with a return to order, law enforcement and
conservative rulings.”).
148. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed: The Supreme Court’s Conservatives
Now Have Free Rein. Here’s How Your Rights Will Change, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 4,
2021, 3:15 AM), https://perma.cc/XT93-SR4K (detailing the Court’s movement
to a conservative majority from the Nixon presidency to the end of the Trump
presidency). Another big player in the court packing movement is the
Federalist Society, a group formed to develop and spread conservative legal
philosophy. See Serwer, supra note 146. Part of the Federalist Society’s goal is
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time in decades, a single swing justice is not “holding the reins”
on contentious decisions,149 as the majority no longer depends
on Chief Justice John Roberts to tie-break.150 As Professor Lee
Epstein points out, there are now “two courts in action.”151 One
is the standard John Roberts court, leaning conservative but
tempered with “a serious amount of consensus” that attempts to
look nonpartisan.152 The other is led by the “aggressive, socially
conservative” Trump appointed justices joined by Justice
Thomas and Justice Alito.153 In practice, both of these courts
could refuse to protect transgender individuals.154
The new majority has already dealt severe blows to certain
fundamental rights. In its early voting rights decision, Brnovich
v. Democratic National Committee,155 the Court reinstated two
Arizona laws that both have a discriminatory impact on
minority voters.156 Deciding that the disproportionate impact of
these provisions was relatively small, the majority explained
that just because voting was “inconvenient” for some did not
mean that the entire system was “not equally open.”157

to promote certain judicial candidates for nomination during Republican
presidencies. See id.
149. Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux & Laura Bronner, The Supreme Court’s
Conservative Revolution Is Already Happening, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 20,
2021, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/3WXE-R4K3.
150. See Ariane de Vogue, The Year Supreme Court Conservatives Make
Their Mark, CNN [hereinafter de Vogue, Court Conservatives],
https://perma.cc/X4X4-BB5V (last updated Dec. 28, 2021, 10:03 AM) (stating
that Chief Justice John Roberts once joked that he “learn[ed] early on that
when you are holding the reins of leadership you should be careful not to tug
on them too much—you will find out they aren’t connected to anything”).
151. Thomson-DeVeaux & Bronner, supra note 149.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Serwer, supra note 146.
155. 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021).
156. See Nina Totenberg, The Supreme Court Deals a New Blow to Voting
Rights, Upholding Arizona Restrictions, NPR, https://perma.cc/B8B6-7XUU
(last updated July 1, 2021, 4:37 PM).
157. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2338 n.11, 2339; see also id. at 2339 (“But the
mere fact there is some disparity in impact does not necessarily mean that a
system is not equally open or that it does not give everyone an equal
opportunity to vote.”). But see Ryan D’Ercole, Note, Fighting a New Wave of
Voter Suppression: Securing College Students’ Right to Vote Through the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 78 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 1659, 1685 (2021)
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The 2021 to 2022 Supreme Court term—the first full term
of the new majority—did not fare any better. With a docket full
of cases altering several constitutional rights, many of the legal
outcomes reflected the majority’s conservative ideology. In New
York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen,158 the Court
expanded the right to own a gun for self-defense from only inside
the home159 to outside the home as well.160 Next, the Court’s
decision in Carson v. Makin161 requires “the state of Maine to
fund religious education at private religious schools as part of
its [public] tuition assistance program.”162 Most controversially,
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization163 dismantled
the decades old constitutional principles protecting the right to
abortion established by Roe v. Wade.164 This trend shows no
signs of stopping—in the upcoming term, the Court will hear
303 Creative LLC v. Elenis165 to decide whether a state
anti-discrimination law violates the free speech rights of a

(criticizing the disproportionate impact of voting laws when enacted for
“partisan motivations”).
158. 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022).
159. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); see id. at 636
(recognizing that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right to
own a handgun in the home for self-defense).
160. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2122 (“[T]he Second and Fourteenth
Amendments protect an individual’s right to carry a handgun for self-defense
outside the home”).
161. 142 S. Ct. 1987 (2022).
162. ACLU Comment on Supreme Court Decision in Carson v. Makin,
ACLU (June 21, 2022), https://perma.cc/R75M-7GU9; see also Carson, 142 S.
Ct. at 2002.
163. 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 148 (“If the
court allows a state to bar the procedure at 15 weeks, there is no reason why
abortions cannot be outlawed at even earlier points in pregnancy . . . .”).
164. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled by Dobbs, 142 S. Ct. 2228; see Dobbs,
142 S. Ct. at 2242 (“We hold that Roe and Casey must be overruled. The
Constitution makes no reference to abortion, and no such right is implicitly
protected by any constitutional provision, including the one on which the
defenders of Roe and Casey now chiefly rely—the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
165. See Orders in Pending Cases, U.S. SUP. CT. (Feb. 22, 2022),
https://perma.cc/PS99-V8HT (PDF) (Granting certiorari to answer “[w]hether
applying a public-accommodation law to compel an artist to speak or stay
silent violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment”).
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Christian web designer who refuses to produce websites for
same-sex couples.166
This is not to say that every Justice in the conservative
block will automatically vote the same way in every case
concerning an individual right. Justices do differ on legal and
political matters.167 Justice Gorsuch’s particular brand of
textualism has led to unusual decisions, most notably his
decision to uphold the Civil Rights Act’s protections for
homosexual and transgender people.168 Chief Justice John
Roberts’s concern for the Court’s legitimacy can lead him to join
the liberal block of justices.169 With the Court’s approval rating
reaching new lows,170 other justices may be more willing to make
the same ideological jump.171 In the majority of cases concerning
individual rights, however, conservative justices are expected to
remain firm. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor stated at an American
Bar Association event, “There is going to be a lot of
disappointment in the law, a huge amount.”172
The thought of this Supreme Court grappling with the
deeply personal issues involved in gender-affirming healthcare
166. See Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Supreme Court Takes Up Clash Between
Religious and LGBT Rights, REUTERS (Feb. 22, 2022, 12:13 PM),
https://perma.cc/7TVT-B5Q5.
167. See Serwer, supra note 146.
168. See id. (explaining Justice Gorsuch’s surprising stance in Bostock v.
Clayton County). But see Elena Schiefele, Note, When Statutory Interpretation
Becomes Precedent: Why Individual Rights Advocates Shouldn’t Be So Quick
to Praise Bostock, 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2021) (explaining that
Justice Gorsuch’s method of statutory interpretation “results in a crabbed,
formalistic, and narrow reading of the text that heightens the evidentiary
burden of a plaintiff who has been wronged” (citation omitted)).
169. Serwer, supra note 146.
170. de Vogue, Court Conservatives, supra note 150.
171. Some Justices have recently taken the “unusual step of appearing
publicly” and even openly defending the institution. Id. In an interview with
CNN, Justice Breyer criticized court packing. Id. Justice Barrett, speaking at
an event hosted by the University of Louisville’s McConnell Center, said that
her goal was to convince the audience that the Court “is not comprised of a
bunch of partisan hacks.” Id. Justice Barrett’s insistence on the nonpartisan
nature of the Court at this event teems with irony, considering its location at
a center named for Senator Mitch McConnell, whose “procedural hardball” was
key to securing her seat. Serwer, supra note 146.
172. Ariane de Vogue, Justice Sonia Sotomayor: ‘There Is Going To Be a
Lot of Disappointment in the Law, a Huge Amount’, CNN,
https://perma.cc/C8PL-TNPV (last updated Oct. 7, 2021, 8:58 PM).
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litigation is frightening. What may be worse is acknowledging
that the new majority was created, at least in part, by the same
group that constructed the gender-affirming healthcare bans.
The Heritage Foundation played a key role in suggesting names
for all of President Trump’s Supreme Court nominations.173 But
understanding that the current Supreme Court is less likely to
protect individual rights does not end the fight against
gender-affirming healthcare bans—it just moves the location of
the playing field.
III. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
The federal Constitution is not the only source of
enforceable individual rights. As Justice William Brennan
pointed out decades ago, state constitutions “are a font of
individual liberties,” and state supreme courts can extend those
liberties beyond federal law.174 This double source of individual
rights is not only a strength of the federal system but a viable
path to strike down gender-affirming healthcare bans.
The layered system of state and federal constitutions,
coined “American federalism” by Justice Brennan and
frequently referred to as “judicial federalism,”175 involves
several principles that can benefit gender-affirming healthcare
litigation. This Part will cover two of the most applicable
principles. Subpart A will discuss the reactionary rights-shifting
framework between federal and state courts,176 while Subpart B
will discuss the laboratory of rights that gender-affirming
healthcare litigators can access.177

173. See Nathaniel Ward, Donald Trump’s Supreme Court List Includes
Five
Heritage
Recommendations,
THE
HERITAGE
FOUND.,
https://perma.cc/45N5-FYV8 (celebrating the Heritage Foundation’s success in
attempting to pack the Supreme Court); David Montgomery, Conquerors of the
Courts, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2019), https://perma.cc/888Y-Z5YQ.
174. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
175. Id. at 489.
176. See infra Part III.A.
177. See infra Part III.B.
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A.

The Rights-Shifting Framework

One key principle of judicial federalism is its demand that
state courts step in when federal courts fail to recognize
individual rights.178 Under this principle, the federal
Constitution becomes only the “starting point” for basic
freedoms with state constitutions offering greater protection.179
This dual protection should create competition in the rights
marketplace, where state governments and courts cover the
failures of the federal system to protect individual freedoms.180
Over time, this principle has encouraged a reactionary
relationship between the state and federal courts concerning
individual rights protection.181
The protection of individual rights under state constitutions
is not a new idea. At the nation’s founding, state constitutions
were the primary defense against state interference because the
federal Constitution offered minimal protection.182 Until the

178. See Brennan, supra note 174, at 491, 503 (stating that “cases that
foreclose federal remedies constitutes a clear call to state courts to step into
the breach” and that “[s]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their
citizens full protection of the federal Constitution”).
179. Betsy Griffing, The Rise and Fall of the New Judicial Federalism
Under the Montana Constitution, 71 MONT. L. REV. 383, 383 (2010) (explaining
that the federal Constitution is the “baseline” for many basic freedoms and
that state courts turn to state constitutions “to support broader protections”
(citation omitted)).
180. See Ann M. Lousin, Justice Brennan’s Call to Arms—What Has
Happened Since 1977, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 387, 406 (2016) (“It is this dual nature
of individual rights in the United States that creates a competition in the
interaction between federal and state rights.” (citation omitted)).
181. One clear example of this relationship is the litigation surrounding
the right to education. In San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize an enforceable right
to education under the federal Constitution. 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973). Since then,
several state courts have recognized the right to education under their own
state constitutions. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d
186, 201 (Ky. 1989) (“[O]ur citizens are given a fundamental right to education
in our Constitution.” (citation omitted)).
182. Cynthia Soohoo & Jordan Goldberg, The Full Realization of Our
Rights: The Right to Health in State Constitutions, 60 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV.
997, 1036–37 (2010) (“[F]rom the beginning of the Founding period, state
constitutions were viewed as the primary protector, and potentially creator, of
individual rights in the states.”(citation omitted)); G. Alan Tarr, The New
Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1097, 1099 (1997)
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Fourteenth Amendment began incorporating the federal Bill of
Rights, state constitutions were the only protectors of
individuals against state government.183
This relationship changed as the federal government
assumed nearly exclusive responsibility for protecting
individual rights between the 1930s and the 1970s. The federal
government’s increased involvement in domestic policy, gradual
incorporation of the Bill of Rights, and the liberal Warren Court
encouraged advocates to bring individual rights cases under the
federal Constitution rather than state counterparts.184
Accordingly, civil liberties law during this period became largely
federal and the prospects of judicial federalism faded into the
background.185
The current state of judicial federalism encouraged by
Justice Brennan emerged after the appointment of Chief Justice
Warren Burger to the Supreme Court in 1969.186 As the Burger
Court became rights restrictive and less likely to protect
individual liberties, judicial federalism urged state courts to

[hereinafter Tarr, New Judicial Federalism] (explaining that the federal
Constitution offered “few protections against state violations of rights”).
183. Soohoo & Goldberg, supra note 182, at 1036 (“Until 1897, when the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . began to be ‘incorporated’ against the states, state
constitutions were viewed as the sole protectors of individual rights against
state governments.” (citations omitted)); see also Rick Applegate, The 1972
Montana State Constitution Declaration of Rights and the Opportunities on the
Bumpy Road Ahead, 43 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 103, 107 (2020) (explaining
that state constitutions “shield[] vulnerable minorities . . . from the
sometimes-runaway intentions of unrestrained, even voracious majorities,
which . . . frequently push[] the legitimate grievances and claims of minorities,
indigenous people, and many others—generally the least advantaged among
us—to the curb”).
184. See Tarr, New Judicial Federalism, supra note 182, at 1100.
185. See id. (stating that the federal government assumed
“primary—indeed, almost exclusive—responsibility for protecting rights”
during the twentieth-century); see also Brennan, supra note 174, at 495 (“[I]t
was only natural that when during the 1960’s our rights and liberties were in
the process of becoming increasingly federalized, state courts saw no reason to
consider what protections, if any, were secured by state constitutions.”).
Among the reasons state constitutional litigation remains underused is the
nature of legal education itself. Law schools rarely teach state constitutional
law, leaving prospective attorneys without the familiarity or applicable
knowledge to invoke their own state constitutions. Soohoo & Goldberg, supra
note 182, at 1035 (citation omitted).
186. Tarr, New Judicial Federalism, supra note 182, at 1097.
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cover the difference.187 Because judicial federalism compels
federal and state courts to provide a healthy balance of
individual protection, the federal courts’ shift into a
rights-restrictive position should reflect oppositely in the state
courts.188
Judicial federalism’s reactionary rights-shifting framework
could be beneficial to gender-affirming healthcare litigation. It
is uncertain whether federal courts will be able to institute
meaningful protections for transgender youth under the current
Supreme Court.189 Transgender people are not considered a
suspect class entitled to heightened protection under the Equal
Protection Clause,190 and the Court’s increasing conservativism
may decrease the chances of positive outcomes under other
federal constitutional principles. Although the ACLU has put
forward appropriate and valuable arguments in its Arkansas
suit, a scenario exists where the Court overvalues the state’s
traditional power over the health of its citizens and ignores the
individual rights of transgender youth.
The absence of federal involvement, however, should force
state courts to prioritize their own state constitutional
protections for transgender individuals. This protection would
not be a groundbreaking shift or an overreach of state court
power—it would be a return to the initial era of judicial
federalism where the state court stood as the only shield against
government interference. If litigators bring state constitutional
claims to protect gender-affirming healthcare after failing at the
federal level, judicial federalism’s rights-shifting framework
demands that state courts step in to enforce these protections.

187. See Brennan, supra note 174, at 495–98 (explaining the Burger
Court’s failure to establish fundamental rights in multiple areas, from welfare
rights to prison rights).
188. Cf. Tarr, New Judicial Federalism, supra note 182, at 1111 (“[T]he
Burger Court’s anticipated—and to some extent actual—retreat from Warren
Court activism encouraged civil liberties litigants to look elsewhere for
redress, the experience of the preceding decades had laid the foundation for
the development of state civil liberties law.”).
189. See supra Part II.B.
190. See Kevin M. Barry et al., A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender People
and the Equal Protection Clause, 57 B.C. L. REV. 507, 509 (2016) (“[N]o court
or agency has ever addressed the critical question of whether statutory
transgender classifications should be subject to ‘heightened scrutiny’ . . . .”).
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Despite this principle, several scholars have noted that
state constitutional claims involving individual rights are
severely under-litigated.191 This issue needs to be remedied in
the context of gender-affirming healthcare litigation.
Federalism is at its weakest when litigators allow state courts
to abdicate their power to protect rights, leaving individuals to
rely solely on an absent federal government.192 The competitive
rights market created by the rights-shifting framework cannot
exist if federal courts get the final word on what rights are or
are not protected. To fully protect transgender individuals from
gender-affirming healthcare bans, litigators need to use the
rights-shifting framework in their favor to invoke the full
gambit of existing legal rights.
B.

The States as Laboratories

The familiar idea of states as laboratories of rights is
another principle of judicial federalism that is beneficial to
striking down gender-affirming healthcare bans.193 States have
long been considered useful laboratories to experiment with
rights not present in the federal Constitution.194 There are
several reasons for this structure,195 but a particularly
191. See Tarr, New Judicial Federalism, supra note 182, at 1113 (“[R]ecent
studies have concluded that the new judicial federalism has had a rather
limited impact on civil liberties litigation in state courts . . . .”); Anthony
Sanders, Why Don’t We See More State Constitutional Claims in Federal
Court? Money and Prudence., INST. FOR JUST., https://perma.cc/4RG7-BE7R
(“[P]laintiffs still rarely raise state constitutional claims in federal court.”).
192. See Brennan, supra note 174, at 503 (“With the federal locus of our
double protections weakened, our liberties cannot survive if the states betray
the trust the Court has put in them.”).
193. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (“It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
194. See Applegate, supra note 183, at 106 (“[S]tates have often been
considered to be useful laboratories for experimentation with new rights that
may be vetted before being offered for addition to the federal Bill of Rights or
otherwise reflected in some way in federal law.”). An example of this
experimentation is women’s suffrage—several states adopted a full or partial
right for women to vote before the changes to the federal Constitution. Id.
(citation omitted).
195. See RICK APPLEGATE, MONT. CONST. CONVENTION COMM’N, BILL OF
RIGHTS 4 (1972), https://perma.cc/9PPD-88VA (PDF) (“[S]tates could function
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important one for gender-affirming healthcare litigation is the
greater adaptability of state constitutions.
State constitutions are generally easier to amend and more
frequently revised than the federal Constitution. The federal
Constitution has been amended only twenty-seven times since
its creation.196 State constitutions are amended at a much
higher frequency—some have over two hundred amendments.197
During the nineteenth century alone, the states adopted
ninety-four different constitutions.198 As Dr. Alan Tarr notes,
“[T]he history of American state constitutionalism is
emphatically a history of constitutional change.”199
The difference in flexibility between the federal
Constitution and state constitutions informs the states’ role as
laboratories for enforceable rights. While the federal
Constitution retains “almost sacred” and unchangeable status,
state constitutions stand for the opposite.200 State constitutions
are progressive enterprises and their drafters are generally
aware that future generations may be better situated to deal
with the issues of modern government.201 Comfort with more
to test a number of potential new rights—a function quite difficult, if not
impossible, at the federal level.”); see also Lawrence Schlam, State
Constitutional Amending, Independent Interpretation, and Political Culture: A
Case Study in Constitutional Stagnation, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 269, 276–77
(1994) (noting that state constitutions are usually longer, more detailed, and
include many more areas of concern than the federal Constitution).
196. G. Alan Tarr, The Montana Constitution: A National Perspective, 64
MONT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003) [hereinafter Tarr, The Montana Constitution].
197. Soohoo & Goldberg, supra note 182, at 1042; see also Robert F.
Williams, Should the Oregon Constitution Be Revised, and If So, How Should
It Be Accomplished?, 87 OR. L. REV. 867, 869 (2008) (noting that the
constitution of Oregon “has been amended on average nearly one-and-a-half
times per year” (citation omitted)).
198. Tarr, The Montana Constitution, supra note 196, at 8 (describing
nineteenth-century state constitution-making as an “epidemic”).
199. Id. at 7.
200. Id. at 8–9 (stating that the reluctance to amend or completely scrap
the original federal Constitution shows its “sacred status” as “the crowning
work of an extraordinary political generation”).
201. See id. at 9 (explaining that state constitutions “require[] a constant
readjustment of past practices and past institutional arrangements in light of
changes in circumstances and in political thought”); see also id. (“[State
constitution-makers] insisted that . . . later generations were better situated
to frame constitutions than were their less experienced, and hence presumably
less expert, predecessors.”).
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frequent amendment ensures that a state constitution better
reflects the wishes of its current citizenry.202
The state laboratory principle can be useful when state
courts tackle controversial topics. Issues affecting transgender
minors are unquestionably controversial.203 Gender-affirming
healthcare bans are not solely about medical procedures. They
involve deeply-held prejudices and sincere beliefs that
transgender individuals, and specifically transgender children,
should not exist.204 Unfortunately, this viewpoint is still widely
debated across the country.205 A familiar refrain among federal
judges concerning such controversial topics is that legislatures,
not courts, should determine the correct course of action.206
In areas of controversy, though, the state laboratory
principle could turn this harsh debate into a strength. Because
state constitutions are easier to amend, the public has a more
involved role in deciding if a constitutional right reflects their
values.207 A state court recognizing a new or expanded right to
202. See Soohoo & Goldberg, supra note 182, at 1042 (“[S]tate constitutions
[are] more responsive to changing values and progressive developments than
the federal Constitution, and allow[] each state to ensure that its governing
document accurately reflects the citizens’ wishes.” (citation omitted)).
203. See Katelyn Burns, What the Battle Over a 7-Year-Old Trans Girl
Could Mean for Families Nationwide, VOX (Nov. 11, 2019, 9:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/S5V6-V75P (detailing the vicious threats individuals sent to
the mother of a transgender girl).
204. See Kristin Lam, National Firestorm on Horizon as States Consider
Criminalizing Transgender Treatment for Youths, USA TODAY (Feb. 6, 2020,
2:21 PM), https://perma.cc/W8AH-9YGT (last updated Feb. 6, 2020, 4:03 PM)
(reporting that a sponsor of South Dakota’s gender-affirming healthcare ban
stated that “[t]he solution for children’s identification with the opposite sex
isn’t to poison their bodies with mega-doses of the wrong hormones, to
chemically or surgically castrate and sterilize them, or to remove healthy
breasts and reproductive organs”).
205. See Justin McCarthy, Mixed Views Among Americans on Transgender
Issues, GALLUP (May 26, 2021), https://perma.cc/3NKH-GWB5.
206. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 686 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (“But this Court is not a legislature. Whether same-sex marriage
is a good idea should be of no concern to us. Under the Constitution, judges
have power to say what the law is, not what it should be.”); id. at 687 (“Stealing
this issue from the people will for many cast a cloud over same-sex marriage,
making dramatic social change that much more difficult to accept.”).
207. See Soohoo & Goldberg, supra note 182, at 1043 (explaining that
“state constitutions may grant broad rights to state residents or citizens, but
those rights can be taken away with greater ease” through constitutional
amendment).
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protect gender-affirming healthcare can therefore rely on the
state legislative process as a backstop to address any residual
controversy. Any state constitutional right that strikes down a
gender-affirming healthcare ban will be controversial. But
judicial protection of transgender youth may receive better
public treatment if allowed to “slowly . . . percolate” at the state
level, rather than being adopted by a “broad, federal
pronouncement” more susceptible to backlash.208 In this way,
state court judges concerned about social controversy can feel
secure in state legislatures’ more flexible political process.
Of course, the state laboratory principle is a double-edged
sword. Even if a state supreme court strikes down a
gender-affirming healthcare ban under a state constitutional
protection, there is the risk that the state’s legislature will
amend its constitution to reverse that protection. But there is
hope that the conversation between a state’s supreme court and
its citizens will eventually result in permanent protection for
transgender individuals. This hope should not be left unrealized
by advocates afraid of backlash—in fact, they should face this
area head on. With both the rights-shifting framework and the
state laboratory principle in mind, litigators need to consider
state constitutional provisions to protect gender-affirming
healthcare.
IV. STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH
State constitutions are vast and complex documents that
can be hard to compare.209 Although there are several state
constitutional provisions that could protect the right to
gender-affirming healthcare for transgender youth, one avenue
with potential is the right to health. This Part discusses the
benefits of pursuing the right to health in the context of
gender-affirming healthcare litigation210 and provides a general
layout of the right to health as it currently exists in state
constitutions.211

208. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to
Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325, 1344 (2010) (citation omitted).
209. See supra notes 197–199 and accompanying text.
210. See infra Part IV.A.
211. See infra Part IV.B.
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Pursuing the Right to Health

The establishment of a right to health fits well within the
beneficial principles of judicial federalism.212 The federal
Constitution does not recognize a right to health—it never
expressly references the word “health” and the Supreme Court
has never interpreted the Constitution to implicitly encompass
a health right.213 Absent explicit guidance from the nation’s
highest court, the lower federal courts have been reluctant to
recognize constitutional rights related to individual health.214
Under the rights-shifting framework of judicial federalism,215
absence of the right at the federal level should trigger state
constitutional protection where the appropriate language exists.
And, because the right to health invokes state constitutional
values, the additional benefits of the state laboratory principle
should be triggered as well.216
There are several other reasons to target a right to health
over other applicable liberties. Significantly, pursuing the right
to health prevents detrimental lockstepping with federal
jurisprudence. Generally, there are three approaches that state
supreme courts use when interpreting their constitutions in
comparison to the federal Constitution: lockstep, limited
lockstep, and independent jurisprudence.217 Each of these
approaches recognizes federal constitutional jurisprudence to a
different extent,218 and the corresponding levels of federal power
could either adversely or positively affect gender-affirming
healthcare litigation.
212. See supra Part III.A.
213. See Leonard, supra note 208, at 1329–30. As Professor Elizabeth
Leonard points out, any federal constitutional right would likely come from
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, either when the government
voluntarily assumes a role in providing healthcare services or when a
protected group challenges a discriminatory provision of services. See id. at
1334–37.
214. See id. at 1330 (“Federal courts have been increasingly reluctant to
recognize new fundamental constitutional rights bearing on individual health,
such as the right of terminally ill patients to assisted suicide or to access
unapproved drugs to prolong their lives.” (citations omitted)).
215. See supra Part III.A.
216. See supra Part III.B.
217. Lousin, supra note 180, at 392.
218. See id. at 392–95.
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When purely lockstepping, a state supreme court will
interpret its state constitutional provision in line with the
federal jurisprudence of the corresponding federal provision.219
Although state courts commonly look to federal courts for some
guidance when interpreting their own constitutional
provisions,220 pure lockstepping negates the beneficial effects of
judicial federalism by causing state courts to produce ostensibly
the same protection as federal courts.221 Under limited lockstep,
state courts presumptively follow the lockstep approach unless
it is clear from the state constitution’s language and history that
a different analysis was intended.222 This approach leaves some
room for independent state analysis where state constitutional
language is not directly analogous to the federal Constitution.223
The final approach, independent jurisprudence, gives state
constitutional provisions the greatest amount of power. Under
this approach, state courts consider the state constitutional
provision without reference to federal jurisprudence, only
looking to the federal courts after deciding the issue according
to state law.224 This approach is most necessary when the state
court must interpret a right without any federal counterpart, as
it would be difficult to lockstep alone.225 Because the right to
pursue health has no counterpart in the federal Constitution,
state courts interpreting the state’s constitution would be forced
to rely on their own independent analysis, free from federal
limitations. This is particularly helpful for gender-affirming
healthcare litigation considering the restrictive approach
federal courts may take in this area.
219. Id. at 392.
220. Tarr, New Judicial Federalism, supra note 182, at 1116.
221. See id. (“[R]eliance on state grounds to decide cases does not
necessarily translate into more rights-affirming decisions.”).
222. Lousin, supra note 180, at 393.
223. Under this approach, the burden is on the party claiming different
analysis to show that the state constitution’s framers intended for state court
jurisprudence to differ from federal jurisprudence. Id. Assumedly, this would
be clear if the language in both constitutions differed.
224. Id. at 394.
225. See id. at 395 (“If there is no federal counterpart to a state
constitutional right, how can there be any role for the lockstep or limited
lockstep approach?”). The constitutional right to hunt and fish, for example, is
a right present under some state constitutions with no federal counterpart. Id.
at 395–96.
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Another benefit associated with the right to health is its
position within the negative rights context, an area where courts
are more comfortable with judicial action. Unlike positive rights
that direct the government to take certain actions, negative
rights only serve to stop state interference in a certain area
without establishing any new judicially-determined duties.226
Although many state constitutions have unique provisions
establishing new rights, most of these rights go unrecognized
because courts fear that recognition will force the judiciary to
make affirmative policy decisions it has neither the competency
nor resources to develop in the absence of a federal
counterpart.227 Claims seeking to prevent state interference,
however, are easier for courts to manage because the remedy is
simply stopping the government’s action.228 Considering this, it
is unsurprising that state constitutional law is already oriented
toward negative rights, especially in the healthcare context.229
Gender-affirming healthcare litigation fits neatly into the
negative rights position. A challenge to one of these bans under
the right to health would seek to prevent the government from
interfering with one’s personal choice to pursue certain medical
care without invoking a positive right to the health services
themselves. A court’s only action would be determining whether
the government’s ban constitutes an impermissible interference
under a certain level of scrutiny, which it is well equipped to

226. See Leonard, supra note 208, at 1331 (“[W]e have negative rights to
be free from government interference, but not affirmative rights to
government services or protection.” (citation omitted)).
227. See Soohoo & Goldberg, supra note 182, at 1047 (“[S]tate courts have
been reluctant to fully enforce unique state constitutional rights.” (citation
omitted)); id. at 998–99 (“The failure of state courts to enforce socio-economic
rights provisions can be traced [to] a reluctance to enforce state constitutional
rights where there is no clear federal analogue.”).
228. See Eric C. Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights:
Socio-Economic Rights and the South African Constitutional Court, 38 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 321, 345 (2007) (stating that negative rights claims
involving individual rights violations are easier for courts to manage because
“they involve discrete cases” and “their remedies implicate only a cessation of
action by government”).
229. See Leonard, supra note 208, at 1396 (“State constitutional law
strongly suggests a strong negative rights orientation, leaving individuals to
pursue their own health care but not obligating the state to provide for them.”).
This framing allows state courts to “draw careful lines to avoid recognizing
broad, enforceable [positive] rights to health.” Id. at 1348.
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do.230 Along with preventing lockstep, this negative rights
framing indicates that a state constitutional right to health has
serious potential to strike down a gender-affirming healthcare
ban. In order to invoke this right, though, it is necessary to
understand its current existence within state constitutions.
B.

Existence of the Right to Health in State Constitutions

Although it has never been fully enforced as a right, a
number of state constitutions address health.231 This makes
sense based on the structure of the federal system. As the
Supreme Court has stated several times, states hold the power
to “promote the health, safety, and general welfare” of their
citizens, and health falls undoubtedly within the Tenth
Amendment’s reserved powers.232 State constitutional language
reflecting this power is applicable to establishing a right to
health. Thirteen state constitutions explicitly mention
“health,”233 and while some merely recognize healthcare as an
important value, others likely trigger enforceable rights.234
State provisions addressing health fall into the following three
categories.

230. State courts are not only well equipped, but they have an “obligation
to enforce state constitutional rights.” Soohoo & Goldberg, supra note 182, at
1071. As the Kentucky Supreme Court noted, “To allow the General
Assembly . . . to decide whether its actions are constitutional is literally
unthinkable.” Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky. 1989).
231. See Mariah McGill & Gillian MacNaughton, The Struggle to Achieve
the Human Right to Health Care in the United States, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 625, 667 (2016); see also Leonard, supra note 208, at 1369 (“It is significant
that several states enshrine health explicitly in their constitutions, unlike the
U.S. Constitution.”).
232. See Soohoo & Goldberg, supra note 182, at 1037 (explaining that the
Supreme Court has assigned the power to promote health and safety to the
states on numerous occasions); see, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 25 (1905) (“[The Supreme Court] has distinctly recognized the authority of
a state to enact . . . health laws of every description . . . .” (internal quotation
omitted)). Most states have exercised this power by establishing public
departments that regulate the practice of medicine and other health
professions. See Leonard, supra note 208, at 1339–40.
233. Leonard, supra note 208, at 1347.
234. See McGill & MacNaughton, supra note 231, at 667 (“While some
provisions merely recognize health care as an important value of public
concern, others arguably contain enforceable rights.” (citing Leonard, supra
note 208, at 1348)).
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The first category of provisions merely identifies health as
a matter of “public value, concern, or aspiration.”235 Louisiana’s
constitution, for example, simply states that, “The legislature
may establish a system of . . . public health.”236 Provisions like
this indicate that health is a concern of the state but do not
contain any mandatory language, making them all but
worthless to establish even a negative right to health.
State constitutional health provisions in the second
category contain mandatory language.237 These provisions
retain the aspirational language about public health and
additionally compel the state to act in furtherance of this
concern.238 Some provisions in this group require the state to
serve the general public.239 Michigan’s constitution, for example,
directs the legislature to “pass suitable laws for the protection
and promotion of the public health” because general health and
welfare “are matters of primary public concern.”240 Other states’
provisions single out particularly vulnerable groups that the
state must provide for, such as disabled individuals or those
living in poverty.241 Some provisions address both.242 When
judicially interpreted, most courts have declined to recognize a

235. Leonard, supra note 208, at 1348.
236. LA. CONST. art. XII, § 8; see also ALA. CONST. amend. 53 (The
state . . . may acquire, build, establish, own, operate and maintain hospitals,
health centers, sanatoria and other health facilities.”).
237. See Leonard, supra note 208, at 1348.
238. See, e.g., id. at 1348–49 (explaining that Michigan’s constitution
includes provisions with both aspirational and mandatory language).
239. See, e.g., S.C. CONST. art. XII, § 1; see also, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VII
§ 4; HAW. CONST. art. IX, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. 7,
§ 20.
240. MICH. CONST. art. 4 § 51.
241. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 19 § 19 (“It shall be the duty of the General
Assembly to provide by law for the support of institutions for the education of
the deaf and dumb and the blind, and also for the treatment of the insane.”);
see also, e.g., MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 86 (providing for the “care of [the] indigent
sick”); N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4 (providing for “the poor, the unfortunate, and
the orphan”).
242. See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 3 (stating that the state shall
provide for “the protection and promotion of the public health” and “financial
assistance, medical assistance and social services for persons who are found to
be in need of and are eligible for such assistance”); see also N.Y. CONST.
art. XVII, §§ 1, 3 (providing for “[t]he protection and promotion of the health
of the inhabitants of the state” and “[t]he aid, care and support of the needy”).
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positive right to healthcare services from these provisions,
refusing to require authorities to provide certain types of
medical care.243 These provisions, however, may still be
applicable to enforce a negative right preventing government
infringement on available health services.244 These provisions
therefore have more potential to protect the right to
gender-affirming healthcare from state interference.
The final category of state constitutional provisions is the
most likely to protect the right to gender-affirming healthcare
in litigation. These provisions expressly elevate health to the
status of a fundamental, enforceable right.245 Montana’s
constitution provides a clear example, stating:
All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights.
They include the right to a clean and healthful environment
and the rights of pursuing life’s basic necessities, enjoying
and defending their lives and liberties, acquiring, possessing
and protecting property, and seeking their safety, health and
happiness in all lawful ways.246

Like the second category, the limited judicial interpretation of
these provisions has been restricted to the negative rights
context rather than an affirmative right to government
services.247 Provisions in this category nonetheless provide the
most textual support for state supreme courts to enforce a right
to health that protects transgender youth from a state
healthcare ban.

243. See Leonard, supra note 208, at 1351–53 (explaining that “[m]ost
cases merely recognize local public health departments’ authority to
promulgate rules and regulations” but that courts have “declined the
opportunity to recognize enforceable rights” to health in the positive rights
context (citations omitted)).
244. See supra notes 229–230 and accompanying text.
245. See Leonard, supra note 208, at 1348.
246. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3. For a less clear example that still may
indicate a fundamental right to health, see ILL. CONST. pmbl. (“We, the People
of the State of Illinois—grateful to Almighty God for the civil, political and
religious liberty which He has permitted us to enjoy and seeking His blessing
upon our endeavors—in order to provide for the health, safety and welfare of
the people . . . .”).
247. See Leonard, supra note 208, at 1361 (“[J]udicial interpretation of
[Montana’s] provision limits [it] to negative rights to be free from
governmental interference, not affirmative rights to government services.”)
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Montana is an interesting case study for gender-affirming
healthcare litigation. Although its constitution contains the
most robust language to protect individual health rights, its
legislature attempted to pass a gender-affirming healthcare ban
in 2021.248 The next Part addresses this ban as a case study for
assessing possible state constitutional litigation.
V.

MONTANA AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH

In assessing whether Montana’s constitution contains an
enforceable right to health, it is important to understand the
constitution itself as well as the state’s constitutional
jurisprudence. This Part explains the broader history of
Montana’s constitution within the principles of judicial
federalism discussed above, and then applies its health
provision to the state’s proposed gender-affirming healthcare
ban.
A.

Montana’s Constitution and Its Interpretation

Montana’s current constitution is not its first. The state’s
first constitution was adopted so that Montana could join the
Union as part of the “class of 1889,” the largest group of states
to adopt constitutions since 1776.249 This constitution was more
of a “tool to achieve statehood” than a “well-thought-out
structure” of government.250 But Montana’s second constitution,
adopted in 1972,251 is much more than a tool for statehood. It is
a “marvelous and surprising” collection of individual rights more
extensive than any other American constitution.252 The 1972
constitution affords “broader than usual anti-discrimination,
equal protection, and individual dignity provisions”253 and
248. H.B. 113, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021) [hereinafter Montana
Law].
249. Tarr, The Montana Constitution, supra note 196, at 2 (citation
omitted).
250. Id. at 3 (internal quotation omitted).
251. Id. at 6.
252. Applegate, supra note 183, at 107.
253. Id. Mr. Applegate worked for the Chairman of the Montana State
Senate’s Judiciary Committee, and researched civil liberties and political
freedoms for the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention Commission. Id. at
103.
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recognizes a number of rights not usually afforded any
protection.254 In total, there are seventeen express rights in
Montana’s constitution that have no federal counterpart.255
Applying the principles of judicial federalism to Montana’s
constitution and its interpretation reveals both successes and
failures relevant to gender-affirming healthcare litigation. A
significant success of Montana’s current constitution is its
embodiment of the laboratory of rights principle. The drafters of
Montana’s 1889 constitution were aware that future
generations would eventually amend it. The chairman of
Montana’s 1889 constitutional convention, Williams Andrews
Clark, acknowledged that “[a]s the generations come and go,
developing rapidly successive changes and conditions, requiring
new methods and additional powers and restraints, we may
expect that the genius and wisdom of our successors will
eliminate, supplement, and amend” the constitution.256 This
endorsement of the laboratory of rights principle is especially
important when considering that the new rights added to the
1972 constitution represented a substantial leap in individual
rights protection.
Montana’s 1972 framers also ensured that citizens had the
appropriate tools to adjust the constitution. Several changes to
the 1972 constitution made it easier to amend than its
predecessor, adding options to propose amendments by
initiative and removing restrictions on the number of
amendments that could be proposed.257 The 1972 constitution
also requires that voters periodically decide whether to call a
new constitutional convention,258 a question that was denied

254. See Tarr, The Montana Constitution, supra note 196, at 17 (“[T]he
1972 constitution recognized a number of rights not mentioned in the 1889
constitution and not usually accorded state constitutional protection.”).
Examples include the explicit right to privacy, bans on discrimination from
private entities, and the positive right to a clean and healthful environment.
Id. (citations omitted).
255. Griffing, supra note 179, at 385. This indicates that the Montana
constitution was not intended to mirror the federal Constitution. Id.
256. JAMES J. LOPACH ET AL., WE THE PEOPLE OF MONTANA: THE WORKINGS
OF A POPULAR GOVERNMENT 7 (1983).
257. Tarr, The Montana Constitution, supra note 196, at 19–20.
258. See MONT. CONST. art. XIV § 3 (“If the question of holding a convention
is not otherwise submitted during any period of 20 years, it shall be submitted
as provided by law at the general election in the twentieth year following the
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when last raised in 2010.259 These mechanisms, combined with
the forward-looking thinking of the constitution’s drafters, have
fashioned Montana into an optimal laboratory to create and test
previously unrecognized rights.
Interpretation of Montana’s constitution, however, reveals
an essential problem with judicial federalism’s rights-shifting
framework—state courts must actively choose to recognize
individual rights not covered by the federal Constitution. When
the state’s highest court abdicates this responsibility, the
negative consequences of lockstepping prevent the promise of
constitutional protection.260 The history of the Montana
Supreme Court’s constitutional jurisprudence demonstrates
this complication.
During the “Golden Age” of Montana’s constitutional
jurisprudence, the state’s Supreme Court was willing to
recognize the state constitution’s expansive rights.261 In this
period, the judiciary confirmed that Montana’s unique
constitutional provisions were “neither hortatory nor
decorative.”262 The Montana Supreme Court retained an
independent analysis approach to interpreting its constitution,
stating that it would “not be bound by the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court where independent state grounds exist
for developing heightened and expanded rights under our state
constitution.”263 The court also explicitly recognized that federal
constitutional precedent would have little value for state

last submission.”); id. § 4 (“If a majority of those voting on the question answer
in the affirmative, the legislature shall provide for the calling thereof at its
next session.”).
259. See 2010 Ballot Issues, MONT. SEC’Y OF ST., https://perma.cc/57YDMB9B.
260. See supra notes 219–221 and accompanying text.
261. See Griffing, supra note 179, at 386–90 (describing several cases from
the Montana Supreme Court that recognized broader protections than those
under the U.S. Constitution).
262. Tarr, The Montana Constitution, supra note 196, at 18 (citation
omitted); see also Applegate, supra note 183, at 126 (“Montana courts have
issued a number of rulings over the years on the Constitution’s provisions,
generally giving them force and fuller meaning.”).
263. Butte Cmty. Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Mont. 1986).
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constitutional interpretations.264 Several significant decisions
from this period reflect these sentiments, notably the court’s use
of the state’s express constitutional right to privacy to invalidate
a criminal sodomy statute—a decision made well before the
federal Supreme Court came to the same conclusion under the
federal Constitution.265
Recent years, however, have seen the Montana Supreme
Court increasingly rely on inhibitive federal precedent when
interpreting its state constitution, resulting in less protection
for individual rights.266 In a decision regarding the state’s
constitutional takings clause, the Montana Supreme Court
found that the provision was coextensive with the federal
takings clause.267 Similarly, in State v. Schneider,268 the
Montana Supreme Court explained that it would look to federal
precedent when reviewing the right to counsel in Montana’s
constitution, unless the constitution’s history expressly stated
that courts should not follow federal precedent.269 This trend
toward lockstep, especially during a time when the federal
Supreme Court is becoming more rights-restrictive, can be
detrimental to invoking or expanding the protections explicitly
stated in the state’s constitution.

264. See Griffing, supra note 179, at 387 (“[T]he Court recognized that
federal constitution precedent would have little sway over state constitutional
interpretation.”).
265. Compare Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 122 (Mont. 1997) (“[A]ll
adults regardless of gender, fully and properly expect that their consensual
sexual activities will not be subject to the prying eyes of others or to
governmental snooping or regulation.”), with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
578 (2003) (“The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The
State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their
private sexual conduct a crime.”).
266. See Griffing, supra note 179, at 390 (“Despite this earlier willingness
to test and implement the new language in the Montana Constitution, the
Montana Supreme Court has retreated in recent years to a reliance upon
federal precedent.”).
267. See Buhmann v. State, 201 P.3d 70, 85 (Mont. 2008).
268. 197 P.3d 1020 (Mont. 2008)
269. See id. at 1026 (explaining that Montana’s right to counsel provisions
are “consistent with the characteristics of the Sixth Amendment right” because
deliberations during the 1972 Constitutional Convention “indicated an
intention on the part of the delegates to align” its provision with the federal
Sixth Amendment).
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The recent movement in Montana’s constitutional
jurisprudence does not outright deny the potential for relief in
the context of gender-affirming healthcare bans.270 As noted,
utilizing the right to health at least partially avoids the
detriments associated with lockstepping.271 But when
determining whether its constitution protects transgender
youth, the Montana Supreme Court will still face the essential
rights-shifting framework problem—it can either embrace its
own rights-expansive jurisprudence to protect individuals or
continue its more restrictive path, leaving fewer avenues for
relief. The next section will explain the state’s gender-affirming
healthcare ban and apply Montana’s constitutional
jurisprudence to both sides of this crossroad.
B.

Potential Litigation in Montana

Montana’s gender-affirming healthcare ban, the Youth
Health Protection Act,272 was introduced by Representative
John Fuller on the second day of the state’s 2021 legislative
session.273 Like the bans discussed above, Montana’s ban forbids
healthcare professionals from providing gender-affirming
healthcare—including puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones,
and surgical gender-reassignment procedures—to individuals
under eighteen years old.274 Violators are subject to “discipline
by the appropriate licensing entity” and an individual aggrieved
by a violation can bring a civil claim for damages.275
The state legislature’s purpose for pursuing such a ban “is
to enhance the protection of minors . . . who experience distress
at identifying with their biological sex.”276 According to the Bill,
it is Montana’s duty to protect children from “irreversible and
270. See Griffing, supra note 179, at 392.
271. See supra Part IV.A.
272. H.B. 113, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2021).
273. See Montana House Bill 113, LEGISCAN, https://perma.cc/GP2J-3NR6.
274. Montana Law, supra note 248.
275. Id. at 4–5 (“A referral for or provision of gender transition procedures
to a minor is considered unprofessional conduct and the health care provider
is subject to discipline by the appropriate licensing entity . . . .”); id. at 5 (“A
person may assert an actual or threatened violation of [the Act] as a claim or
defense in a judicial or administrative proceeding and obtain compensatory
damages, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or any other appropriate relief.”).
276. Id. at 1.
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drastic nongenital gender reassignment surgery” because there
is a “lack of studies showing that the benefits of these extreme
interventions outweigh the risks.”277 Speaking about his
legislation, Representative Fuller said that “[c]hildren should be
free from either parental, peer or cultural pressure to deal with
their gender confusion by starting down a one-way road to
lifelong medical intervention.”278 Although this bill died in
process at the end of the 2021 session,279 time will tell how
successful its progeny will be.
Striking down a ban like this under Montana’s right to
health would involve three steps. First, the right to health must
be firmly established as enforceable. Second, the court must
assign a level of scrutiny to determine whether the right has
been infringed on by the gender-affirming healthcare ban.
Finally, the court must enforce the right to strike down the
ban.280 The next three sections will discuss each of these in turn.

277. Id.
278. Shaylee Ragar, Lawmakers Advance Revised Bill Restricting Trans
Health Care, MONT. PUB. RADIO (Feb. 22, 2021, 6:47 PM),
https://perma.cc/H98G-H63D.
279. See Bill Actions, MONT. LEGISLATURE DETAILED BILL INFO.,
https://perma.cc/KNK4-EZME.
280. Litigators challenging Montana’s gender-affirming healthcare ban
will also need to establish standing to bring suit. The youth affected by the law
are likely able to establish standing under current Montana constitutional
jurisprudence. To establish standing for a constitutional challenge, the
complaining party must satisfy two criteria: 1) they must clearly allege past,
present, or threatened injury to a property or civil right; and 2) the alleged
injury must be distinguishable from the injury to the public generally. Mont.
Env’t Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1242 (Mont. 1999).
Psychological injuries caused by a challenged law satisfy the first prong of
standing. See Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 120 (Mont. 1997). The Montana
Supreme Court has broadened the second prong to include harm that could be
common to the general public but that affect the individual in ways not
common to the public. See Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 369 (Mont. 1999).
Essentially, plaintiffs must simply be individuals against whom the statute is
intended to operate. Gryczan, 942 P.2d at 119–20. The severe consequences
caused by the absence of gender-affirming healthcare easily establish standing
because they are both psychological and individual to the child suffering from
gender dysphoria. See supra Part I.B.
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Establishing the Right

The right to pursue health can be firmly enforceable under
the Montana constitution. In Wadsworth v. State,281 the
Montana Supreme Court established a test to determine
whether a right is fundamental and therefore enforceable.282
Under this test, a right is fundamental if it is either: 1) found in
the constitution’s Declaration of Rights; or 2) is a right without
which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little
meaning.283 The right to pursue health likely satisfies either of
these prongs.
Language concerning the right to health appears in
Montana’s Declaration of Rights, which is Article II of the state’s
constitution.284 Article II includes several individual rights
provisions,285 but § 3 is the most relevant to the
gender-affirming healthcare litigation. As noted in Part IV’s
discussion of state constitutional health provisions, this section
states that all persons “have certain inalienable rights,”
including “the rights of pursuing life’s basic necessities . . . and
seeking their safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways.”286
Because the “inalienable” right to seek “safety, health and
happiness” is explicitly enumerated in Montana’s Declaration of
Rights,287 the state court should easily recognize it as
enforceable.288 The Montana Supreme Court has established a
judicially protected right solely from Article II’s text before—in
Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department of
Environmental Quality,289 it found the right to a “clean and
healthful environment” under the same section.290

281. 911 P.2d 1165 (Mont. 1996).
282. See id. at 1171–72.
283. Id.
284. MONT. CONST. art. II.
285. See generally id.
286. MONT. CONST. art. II., § 3.
287. Id.
288. See supra notes 282–283 and accompanying text.
289. 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999).
290. See id. at 1246 (“[W]e conclude that the right to a clean and healthful
environment is a fundamental right because it is guaranteed by the
Declaration of Rights found at Article II, Section 3 of Montana’s
Constitution . . . .”).
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Although not necessary, the right to health also fulfills the
second prong of the fundamental right analysis as a right
without which other rights would have little meaning.291 In
Wadsworth, the Montana Supreme Court used a “practical
matter” indicator to determine whether a right not explicitly
written in the Declaration of Rights should be considered
fundamental.292 In explaining why the right to pursue
employment was fundamental despite its lack of textual
support, the Wadsworth court reasoned:
As a practical matter, employment serves not only to provide
income for the most basic of life’s necessities, such as food,
clothing, and shelter for the worker and the worker’s family,
but for many, if not most, employment also provides their
only means to secure other essentials of modern life,
including health and medical insurance, retirement, and day
care.293

Because the right to pursue employment practically affected the
attainment of other enumerated rights, like the right to pursue
life’s basic necessities, it was deemed fundamental.294 This
reasoning applies similarly to the right to health, and the
Montana Supreme Court has already noted the importance of
making personal health decisions. In Armstrong v. State,295 for
example, the court noted that:
One’s health is a uniquely personal possession. . . . “[A
health] decision can either produce or eliminate physical,
psychological, and emotional ruin. It can destroy one’s
economic stability. It is, for some, the difference between a
life of pain and a life of pleasure. It is, for others, the
difference between life and death.”296

291. Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1171–72 (Mont. 1996).
292. Id. at 1172 (explaining that the right to employment should be
considered a fundamental right even when not enumerated in the Declaration
of Rights).
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1173 (“Article II, section 3 of Montana’s constitution
encompasses the right to the opportunity to pursue employment generally as
a necessary incident of the fundamental right to pursue life’s basic
necessities . . . .”).
295. 989 P.2d 364 (Mont. 1999).
296. Id. at 378 (quoting Andrews v. Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1047 (S.D.
Tex. 1980)).
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This language strongly suggests that the freedom to make
personal health decisions implicates several enumerated rights,
including the right to pursue life’s basic necessities and the right
to pursue happiness.297 For youth specifically, a violation of the
right to health could also implicate the right to education, which
the Montana Supreme Court established as fundamental in
Columbia Falls Elementary School District No. 6. v. State.298
Regardless of the avenue, an enforceable right to health can be
established under Montana’s constitution for the purpose of
striking down gender-affirming healthcare bans.
2.

Assigning Scrutiny

After formally establishing the right to health, the court
must then assign a level of scrutiny by which to determine
whether a state action violates that right. Under Montana’s
constitutional jurisprudence, the level of scrutiny assigned to a
right “depends both on the nature of the interest and the degree
to which it is infringed.”299 Accordingly, the Montana Supreme
Court assigns one of three levels of scrutiny. Strict scrutiny, the
most stringent standard, is imposed when the challenged action
“interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
discriminates against a suspect class.”300 Under strict scrutiny,
a piece of government legislation must be justified by a
“compelling state interest and must be narrowly tailored to
effectuate only that compelling interest.”301 A middle-tier level
of scrutiny applies when the implicated right is not in the
Declaration of Rights, but appears in the state’s constitution as

297. MONT. CONST. art. II., § 3.
298. 109 P.3d 257 (Mont. 2005); see id. at 312–13 (Mont. 2005). The scope
of this Note cannot adequately cover the implications that a violation of the
right to health may have on the right to education, but this question certainly
merits further scholarship.
299. Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1173 (citations omitted).
300. Id. at 1174 (citation omitted); see id. (applying strict scrutiny to an
administrative rule that interfered with the fundamental right to
employment); see also Mont. Env’t Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Env’t Quality, 988 P.2d
1236, 1245–46 (Mont. 1999) (applying strict scrutiny to any statute or rule
implicating the right to a clean and healthful environment).
301. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 374 (citations omitted).
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a directive to the legislature.302 If the right does not fall into
either of these categories, the court assigns it rational basis
review.303
Because the right to pursue health is fundamental, the
court should apply a strict scrutiny analysis. Strict scrutiny in
Montana requires the government to show a compelling state
interest for its action.304 Additionally, the state’s action must be
closely tailored to effectuate only that interest and be the “least
onerous path.”305 To justify its gender-affirming healthcare ban,
the Montana legislature would have to meet all these
qualifications.
Much of this may sound easy to establish so far. That may
be because arguing that the freedom to make personal health
decisions without state interference feels both morally and
legally right to many litigators. But in deciding whether to
invalidate a gender-affirming healthcare ban under the right to
health, the Montana Supreme Court will face the same essential
crossroad previously discussed—it can protect transgender
youth by enforcing the right or abdicate responsibility entirely.
3.

Invalidating the Law

The Montana Supreme Court has precedential support to
either enforce or forego the right to health in the context of
striking down a gender-affirming healthcare ban. There are two
key cases illustrating both of these choices: Armstrong v. State
and Montana Cannabis Industry Ass’n v. State.306
Armstrong v. State would be the strongest jurisprudence to
invalidate a gender-affirming healthcare ban. In Armstrong, the
Montana Supreme Court invalidated two statutes that
prohibited certain medical professionals from performing
abortions.307 The petitioners argued that these statutes violated

302. Mont. Env’t Info. Ctr., 988 P.2d at 1245. It would be interesting to see
how this level of scrutiny would interact with the second category of healthcare
provisions noted in Part IV.B.
303. See Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1178 (Mont. 1996)
(Trieweiler, J., concurring).
304. Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1170.
305. Id. at 1174.
306. 286 P.3d 1161 (Mont. 2012).
307. Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 370 (Mont. 1999).
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the right to privacy by preventing a woman from obtaining a
lawful medical procedure from the healthcare provider of her
choosing.308 Though Armstrong struck down the laws under the
constitutional right to privacy, its language is applicable to the
right to health in three ways. First, Armstrong acknowledged
the importance of individual medical decision-making.309
Second, the Armstrong court connected this importance directly
to the right to health.310 Finally, the court established a test
directly applicable to gender-affirming healthcare litigation.311
Armstrong clearly lays out the significance of personal
medical decision-making. The court explicitly stated that “[f]ew
matters more directly implicate personal autonomy and
individual privacy than medical judgments affecting one’s bodily
integrity.”312 It also noted that constitutional rights can be
violated “by the withholding of . . . physical treatment.”313 Given
that individual medical decisions have a direct impact on one’s
health, this language necessarily applies to the right to health
in the context of gender-affirming healthcare. Further,
asserting that one’s right to health is violated when the
government withholds gender-affirming healthcare necessarily
implies that these services are healthy for an individual to
pursue. This could be an extremely powerful statement,
especially during a period when transgender individuals are
publicly accused of being “sick.”314
Although in dicta, the Armstrong court connected the
importance of medical decision-making to the right to health.
After completing its primary constitutional analysis under the
right to privacy, the court further explained that other portions
of Montana’s constitution could also be implicated by the

308. Id. at 368.
309. See infra notes 312–314 and accompanying text.
310. See infra notes 315–316 and accompanying text.
311. See infra notes 317–325 and accompanying text.
312. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 378.
313. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
314. See Dillon Richards, Oklahoma Lawmaker Accused of Bigotry After
Saying
Transgender
People
‘Have
Mental
Illness’,
ABC,
https://perma.cc/UA79-Q7SC (last updated Apr. 15, 2021, 5:08 PM) (quoting
an Oklahoma lawmaker as staying that “I understand transgender people
have mental illness . . . your insanity certainly is scary”).
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impermissible legislation.315 The court noted that Article II, § 3’s
right to safety, health, and happiness would also be applicable
when the right to make personal medical judgments suffers
governmental interference.316 This language easily serves as a
paradigm to attach legislation affecting medical decisions
directly to the right to health.
Past these foundational pieces, Armstrong is especially
advantageous to gender-affirming healthcare litigation because
it establishes an applicable test to determine whether
legislation violates the right to health. To decide whether state
abortion laws violated the right to privacy, the Armstrong court
devised what this Note calls the “bona fide test.” The court
articulated:
Except in the face of a medically-acknowledged, bona fide
health risk, clearly and convincingly demonstrated, the
legislature has no [compelling] interest . . . to justify its
interference with an individual’s fundamental privacy right
to obtain a particular lawful medical procedure from a health
care provider that has been determined by the medical
community to be competent to provide that service and who
has been licensed to do so.317

This test applies strict scrutiny analysis directly to legislation
affecting medical decisions, balancing the individual’s interest
with the state’s regulatory power. The right to health could
largely borrow this language, asserting the “health right” in
place of the “privacy right.”
In establishing this test, the court further explained that a
state’s action is impermissible when the “legislature thrusts
itself” upon individuals “under the guise” of protection, but in
reality is attempting to “promot[e] their own beliefs.”318 Here,
315. Here, the court noted that Montana’s Declaration of Rights “is not
simply a cook book of disconnected and discrete rules written with the vitality
of an automobile insurance policy,” but rather “a cohesive set of principles,
carefully drafted and committed to an abstract ideal of just government.”
Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 383.
316. See id. (“Article II, Section 3, guarantees . . . the inalienable right to
seek safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways—i.e., . . . the right to seek
and obtain medical care from a chosen health care provider and to make
personal judgments affecting one’s own health and bodily integrity without
government interference.”).
317. Id. at 380.
318. Id.
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the court criticized the “unrelenting pressure” from
“organizations promoting their own particular values.”319
The bona fide test should definitively strike down
Montana’s gender-affirming healthcare ban. There is no bona
fide health risk, let alone one that is clearly and convincingly
demonstrated, that justifies withholding all gender-affirming
healthcare from transgender youth. The relevant medical
community has confirmed that these procedures are the primary
treatment for severe cases of gender dysphoria, which have
dangerous physical and psychological consequences for
transgender youth.320 Two recognized institutions have
established
medical
guidelines
for
prescribing
and
administering gender-affirming healthcare, each with multiple
safeguards to protect the patient.321 And even with these
safeguards, most of the medical procedures for individuals
under eighteen are reversible with few health consequences.322
Puberty blockers are completely reversible if the patient decides
they do not want to transition.323 Cross-sex hormones are also
partially reversible and have few health risks.324 Surgical
interventions, the only irreversible treatment, are not permitted
until an individual turns eighteen, making Montana’s law
wholly inapplicable.325 Simply stated, the absence of a bona fide
health risk means Montana has no compelling interest to
interfere with the lives of transgender youth. The Montana
legislature, along with the other legislatures attempting to pass
a similar ban, is using a bogus concern about health to force its
own misguided beliefs about transgender individuals onto the
general public—this is not only constitutionally impermissible,
but serves only to worsen the health of the citizens the state is
obligated to protect.
While it would be optimal if the precedent set by Armstrong
eliminated Montana’s gender-affirming healthcare ban,
Armstrong does have its analogue. Precedent beginning in Wiser
319. Id.
320. See supra Parts I.A, I.B.
321. See supra Part I.A.
322. See supra note 97–98 and accompanying text; supra Part I.A.
323. See supra Part I.A.
324. See, e.g., Feminizing Hormone Therapy, MAYO CLINIC,
https://perma.cc/D62E-5SZ7.
325. See Montana Law, supra note 248; supra Part I.A.
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v. State326 and solidified by Montana Cannabis Industry Ass’n v.
State could deny relief altogether.
In Wiser, the court began to cabin the individual rights
implicated by state health laws. The law challenged in Wiser
required denturists, specialized dental care professionals who
work exclusively with tooth replacement, to refer partial
denture patients to dentists “as needed.”327 Immediately,
dentists claimed that denturists were required to refer all
partial denture patients, while denturists claimed that referrals
were discretionary.328 After the state Board of Dentistry
promulgated a rule requiring denturists to refer all partial
denture patients to dentists, denturists sued on grounds that
the rule impermissibly infringed on the patient’s right to
privacy.329
Finding the rule constitutionally permissible, the Wiser
court explained that although individuals have the right to seek
their own medical treatment, they do not have the right to
obtain medical care free of regulation.330 Because the court
framed the issue as denturists’ desire to establish the right to be
free from regulation instead of patients’ right to make medical
choices, Armstrong’s bona fide test was inapplicable.331
Unsurprisingly, the right to be free from regulation does not
exist in Montana’s constitution, so the court used rational basis
scrutiny to determine whether the rule was constitutionally
permissible.332 Finding that the state’s interest in regulating
health outweighed an individual’s interest in privacy, the court
upheld the rule.333 The Wiser court further emphasized that
Article II, § 3’s phrasing that individuals have the right to seek
“[safety, health and happiness] in all lawful ways”334 indicated

326.
327.

129 P.3d 133 (Mont. 2006).
Id. at 136; see also Denturist vs Dentist: Why You Need Both, FUTURE
SMILES DENTURE CLINIC, https://perma.cc/2G6H-8PRP.
328. Wiser, 129 P.3d at 136.
329. Id. at 136–37.
330. Id. at 137–38.
331. See id.
332. See id. at 138–39.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 139 (emphasis in original).
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that pursuit of an enumerated right is “necessarily subordinate
to reasonable restraint and regulation by the state.”335
Wiser alone does not endanger gender-affirming healthcare
litigation. For one thing, Montana’s ban is not mere regulation,
but an outright prohibition on medical services.336 More
troubling is that Wiser was a shift from the Montana Supreme
Court’s previous protection of individual rights—a shift that
continued to gain momentum in Montana Cannabis.
In Montana Cannabis, the court examined a medical
marijuana law that prohibited providers from assisting more
than three authorized medical marijuana users.337 The law was
challenged on several grounds, including an allegation that it
violated the medical marijuana user’s fundamental right to
pursue health.338 In this context, the Montana Supreme Court
briefly acknowledged, but immediately dismissed, the right to
health. While it noted that the “[f]undamental right to seek
health” exists in Montana’s constitution, it extinguished that
right by emphasizing the “in all lawful ways” language.339
Extending Wiser, the court stated, “The Constitution is clear
that the right to seek health is circumscribed by the state’s
police power to protect the public’s health and welfare.”340
Accordingly, the court rejected the right to health argument,
explaining that although “an individual has a fundamental right
to obtain . . . medical treatment,” they do not have “a
fundamental right to use any drug, regardless of its legality.”341
Failing to apply even rational basis scrutiny, the court found
that “[a] patient’s selection of a particular treatment . . . is
within the [government’s] interest in protecting public health,

335. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
336. See Montana Law, supra note 248; supra Part I.A.
337. Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 286 P.3d 1161, 1163 (Mont.
2012); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-308 (2021) (repealed 2022) (“A
provider or marijuana-infused products provider may assist a maximum of
three registered cardholders.”).
338. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1164 (“The District Court found that
these sections substantially implicated the Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights to
pursue employment, to seek one’s own health in all lawful ways, and to
privacy.”).
339. Id. at 1166.
340. Id. (citation omitted).
341. Id.
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and regulation of that [treatment] does not implicate a
fundamental constitutional right.”342
As with Wiser, Montana Cannabis’s implications do not
extinguish relief for transgender youth under a right to health.
There are several key differences between a law regulating the
number of users for a certain treatment and an all-out ban of a
certain medical service. Moreover, during a subsequent appeal,
the Montana Supreme Court emphasized the state’s goal of
introducing medical marijuana into society legally because the
court was concerned with marijuana’s federal status as an
illegal Schedule I controlled substance.343 Certainly, no similar
circumstances exist in the gender-affirming healthcare context.
But Montana Cannabis’s treatment of the right to health
illustrates a dangerous avenue the court could take to stand idly
by as the legislature regulates what it pleases. If the
gender-affirming healthcare bans were challenged under the
right to health, the court would have to decide whether the
state’s power to protect health can circumscribe an individual’s
right to pursue it.
The answer to this question may lie in Justice James
Nelson’s dissent in Montana Cannabis. Justice Nelson, the
author of Armstrong and the sole dissenter in Montana
Cannabis, summarized aptly that “the Montana Constitution
generally, and the Declaration of Rights especially, serve as a
restraint on governmental power.”344 Because of this, the court’s
insistence that constitutional rights can be circumscribed by
legislative action is not only “grave[ly] concern[ing]” but
“renders meaningless” the rights themselves.345 According to
Justice Nelson, the power of the constitution to restrain the
342. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
343. See Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 368 P.3d 1131, 1138 (Mont.
2016) (“We begin by acknowledging the proverbial ‘elephant in the room.’
Marijuana is a Schedule I Controlled Substance under the federal Controlled
Substances Act . . . .” (citation omitted)).
344. Mont. Cannabis, 286 P.3d at 1172–73 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (citing
State ex rel. James v. Aronson, 314 P.2d 849, 852 (1957) (“[T]he State
Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislature and not a grant
of power to that body.”)).
345. Id. at 1172 (“I have grave concerns with the Court’s suggestions that
the rights enumerated in Article II, Section 3 are circumscribed by the State’s
police power. . . . If this proposition were true, then the constitutional rights
at issue would be rendered meaningless.” (citations omitted)).
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state from interfering with an individual’s fundamental rights
is destroyed if those rights are dictated by the “changing
compositions of the legislative and executive branches.”346 These
ideals could not be more applicable to gender-affirming
healthcare litigation. A state must ensure that its citizens live
healthy and full lives, not police them according to certain
discriminatory opinions. Although Montana’s Supreme Court
has precedent to either enforce or forego the protection of
transgender youth under the right to health, it should step in to
protect them.
CONCLUSION
Gender-affirming healthcare, and health itself, is important
and difficult to constitutionally protect. An individual’s health
depends not only on equal access to the appropriate medical
care, but requires a social and political climate that ensures the
full rights of citizenship for all.347 Health can only be benefitted
by public policies and legal reforms that eliminate prejudice,
discrimination, and stigma.348 Transgender individuals will
continue to exist regardless of state legislatures but it is the
law’s duty to ensure that they have the ability to live healthy,
full lives. In the current war against this ideal, lawyers must
invoke innovative strategies to explore every possible avenue for
constitutional success. Courts too must contribute by enforcing
protections for transgender individuals against invasive laws,
especially if they become the last line of defense.
Action is needed on all fronts. As legislative sessions pass,
gender-affirming healthcare bans mutate to invade further into
the personal liberties of transgender individuals. Texas
Governor Greg Abbott recently directed his state’s Department
of Family and Protective Services to investigate any parent who
“subjects” their child to gender transition procedures for child

346. Id. at 1173.
347. See WPATH SOC, supra note 35, at 1 (“[H]ealth is dependent upon
not only good clinical care, but also social and political climates that provide
and ensure social tolerance, equality, and the full rights of citizenship.”).
348. See id. at 1–2 (“Health is promoted through public policies and legal
reforms that promote tolerance and equity for gender and sexual diversity and
that eliminate prejudice, discrimination, and stigma.”).
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abuse.349 And gender-affirming healthcare bans are not the only
laws states attempt to pass in order to punish transgender
individuals. There are efforts to exclude transgender youth from
participating in school activities,350 to prevent them from using
their gender’s public bathroom,351 and to erase their history
from educational instruction.352
In the face of these challenges, lawyers need to take
advantage of state constitutional protections.353 They should
apply the principles of judicial federalism in their favor to
invoke the power and protection that state courts have the
ability to give.354 They should pragmatically search through
relevant provisions and confidently assert new rights to protect
transgender youth from invasive state interference.355 They
must challenge state courts to enforce the merits of their
constitutions, and in return, state courts should provide
protection.356 These are no doubt difficult calls to action. But like
gender-affirming healthcare itself, these actions are vital,
necessary, and carry the hope for a better future.

349. Letter from Greg Abbot, Governor of Tex., to Jamie Masters, Comm’r
of the Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs. (Feb. 22, 2022),
https://perma.cc/5TRZ-RPNF (“Because the Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services (DFPS) is responsible for protecting children from abuse, I
hereby direct your agency to conduct a prompt and thorough investigation of
any reported instances of [gender-affirming healthcare] procedures in the
State of Texas.”).
350. See, e.g., S.B. 766, 2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2022) (“Male students
shall not be permitted to participate on any school athletic team or squad
designated for ‘females,’ ‘women,’ or ‘girls.’”).
351. See H.B. 1005, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (S.D. 2022) (“The school
administrator shall designate any multi-occupancy shower room, changing
room, or rest room, located in a public school, for use exclusively by members
of the same sex.”).
352. See H.F. 2054, 2022 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2022) (allowing
parents to remove their children from classes that discuss gender identity or
sexuality).
353. See supra Part IV.
354. See supra Part III.
355. See supra Parts IV, V.
356. See supra Part V.

